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CRIMINAL LAW
THE JUVENILE COURT MEETS THE
PRINCIPLE OF THE OFFENSE:
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN
JUVENILE WAIVER STATUTES*
BARRY C. FELD**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court decision In re Gault ' precipitated a procedural revolution that has transformed the juvenile
court into a very different legal institution than that envisioned by
its Progressive creators. 2 Although the Supreme Court's decisions
mandating procedural safeguards in the juvenile process were not
explicitly intended to alter the fundamental character of the juvenile
court or its therapeutic mission, judicial refinements and legislative
changes introduced to bring the juvenile court's administration into
harmony with the requirements of the Constitution have substantially modified the purposes, processes, and operations of the juvenile justice system during the past two decades.
A brief description of the Progressives' conception of the juvenile court illustrates how the Supreme Court's decisions and subse* This research was supported by the University of Minnesota Law Alumni
Association's "Partners in Excellence" program. The author wishes to thank Ms. Susan
Pasch for her exceptional research assistance. An earlier version of this Article was
presented at the 1986 Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Atlanta,
Georgia.
** Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Ph.D., Harvard University,
1973; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1969; B.A., University of Pennsylvania,
1966.
1 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2 Feld, CrinzinalizingJuvenileJustice: Rules of Procedurefor Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 141, 141 (1984) [hereinafter CriminalizingJuvenileJustice]. See D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE
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quent legislative action have transformed the juvenile court into a
very different institution from the one originally proposed. The
Progressives envisioned a procedurally informal court with individualized, offender-oriented dispositional practices. The Supreme
Court's due process decisions engrafted procedural formality at adjudication on to the juvenile court's traditional, individualized treatment sentencing schema. As the contemporary juvenile court
departs from its original procedural and substantive conception, it
has become increasingly criminalized and converged with adult
criminal courts. 3 Although the juvenile court's post-Gault procedural convergence with criminal courts has been described extensively, 4 its pursuit of the substantive goals of the criminal process
have not been thoroughly documented. 5
This Article analyzes juvenile court waiver statutes as an indicator of the extent to which current juvenile court sentencing practices
depart from those envisioned by the Progressive creators. The handling of serious young offenders has received extensive legislative
and judicial scrutiny as some of the most troublesome youths in the
juvenilejustice process are moved to criminal courts for prosecution
as adults. 6 A waiver decision is also a sentencing decision which
represents a choice between the punitive dispositions of adult criminal courts and the nominally rehabilitative dispositions of the juvenile court. 7 Increasingly, the principle of offense dominates this
sentencing decision, as "just deserts" based on the offense, rather
than the real needs of the offender, prescribe the appropriate disposition. The waiver of a serious offender into the adult system on the
3 CriminalizingJuvenileJustice,supra note 2; FeldJuvenile Court LegislativeReform and the
Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal", 65 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1981)
[hereinafter Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal"].
4 McCarthy, Pre-adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historical and Constitutional
Analysis, 42 U. PITr. L. REV. 457 (1981); Rosenberg, The ConstitutionalRights of Children
Charged with Crime: Proposalfora Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656
(1980).
5 CriminalizingJuvenileJustice,supra note 2, at 246-66; Gardner, Punishment andJuvenile
Justice: A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35
VAND. L. REV. 791 (1982).
6 See, e.g., Feld, Reference ofJuvenile Offendersfor Adult Prosecution: The LegislativeAlternato Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515 (1978) [hereinafter Reference of
tive
Juvenile Offenders]; Dismantlingthe "RehabilitativeIdeal", supra note 3; Feld, Delinquent Careers
and CriminalPolicy: Just Deserts and the Waiver Decision, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 195 (1983) [hereinafter Delinquent Careers and CriminalPolicy].
7 Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6; CriminalizingJuvenileJustice,supra note 2, at
269; READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 169-377 (J. Hall, D. Hamparian, J. Pettibone &J. L.
White eds. 1981); YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS (D. Hamparian, L.

Estep, S. Muntean, R. Priestino, R. Swisher, P. Wallace &J. L. White eds. 1982); WHITEBREAD & BATEY, The Role of Waiver in theJuvenile Court: Questions of Philosophy and Function,
in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 207.
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basis of his offense rather than an individualized evaluation of the
youth's "amenability to treatment" or "dangerousness" is both an
indicator of and a contributor to the substantive as well as procedural criminalization of the juvenile court.

II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

THE PROGRESSIVE JUVENILE COURT-PROCEDURAL INFORMALITY
AND INDIVIDUALIZED, OFFENDER-ORIENTED DISPOSITIONS

During the last third of the nineteenth century and the early
decades of the twentieth century, rapid industrialization, economic
modernization, urbanization, immigration, and social change overwhelmed traditional social stability and posed fundamental new
problems of social control. 8 The completion of the railroads fostered economic growth, integrated the economy, and altered the
processes of manufacturing, modified the mechanisms of economic
socialization, and fundamentally changed the social and legal position of youth during the transition from a rural agrarian society to
an urban industrial one. 9 Increased urbanization and immigration
and a dramatic shift in the ethnic origins of the immigrants reaching
America accompanied the changing economic base.10 The social organization of cities changed, as poor people from rural America and
Europe were concentrated in slums and ethnic enclaves and lived in
desperate conditions of poverty in cities unable to provide basic municipal or social services."I
A modernizing of the family and a changing cultural conception
of childhood accompanied these structural shifts. Demographic
changes in the numbers and spacing of children and a shift of economic functions from the family to other work environments modified the roles of women and children.' 2 Especially within the upper
8 S. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM 1885-1914 (1957); R. HOFSTADTER, THE
AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955); D. NOBLE, AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM (1977); R. WIEBE, THE
SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967).
9 J. KETr, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA, 1790 TO THE PRESENT 11416 (1977); R. WIEBE, supra note 8; B. WISHY, THE CHILD AND THE REPUBLIC 94-114

(1968).
10 H. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 18601925 87 (1974).
11 W. TRATINER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 135 (3d ed. 1984); H. WILENSKY & C. LEBEAUX, INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
AND SOCIAL WELFARE 115-32 (1958).
12 C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION

TO THE PRESENT 178-209 (1980);J. DEMOS & S. BOOCOCK, TURNING POINTS: HISTORICAL
AND SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS ON THE FAMILY (1978);J. KETr, supra note 9; C. LASCH, HAVEN
IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED 6-10 (1977).
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and middle classes, a more modern conception of childhood
emerged. Children were perceived as corruptible innocents whose
upbringing required greater physical, social, and moral structure
than had previously been regarded as prerequisite to adulthood,
and the family, particularly women, assumed a greater role in super13
vising children's moral and social development.
The Progressive movement emerged around the turn of the
century in response to the social problems caused by rapid industrialization, urbanization, and modernization. 14 Progressive reformers
prescribed rational and scientific solutions designed by experts and
administered by the state. 15 Many Progressive programs shared a
unifying child-centered theme, and the changing cultural conception of childhood affected the Progressives' policies embodied in juvenile court legislation, child labor laws, child welfare laws, and
16
compulsory school attendance laws.
The Progressives introduced a number of criminal justice reforms at the turn of the century: probation, parole, indeterminate
sentences, and the juvenile court. All emphasized open-ended, informal, and highly flexible policies to rehabilitate the deviant. 17 Because identifying the causes and prescribing the cures for
delinquency required an individualized approach which precluded
uniformity of treatment or standardization of criteria, a pervasive
13 P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD 329 (1962); C. DEGLER, supra note 12, at 86110; J. KE-r, supra note 9, at 109-43; A. PLATr, THE CHILDSAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY 75-83 (2d ed. 1977); B. WISHY, supra note 9, at 116.
14 R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 8; G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATIVISM: A
REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963);J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPO-

RATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE, 1900-1918 (1968); R. WIEBE, supra note 8.
15 See, e.g., S. HAYS, supra note 8, at 156; R. WIEBE, supra note 8, at 166-70; Stone, A
Spectre is Haunting America: An Interpretationof Progressivism, 3 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 239
(1979). The Progressives' reliance on the state to implement their social reforms reflected their perception of the benevolence of state action, the ability of government to
correct social problems, a confidence in their own values, and a belief in the propriety of
inculcating these values in others. They expressed no reservations about their attempts
to transform immigrants, the poor and their children into sober, virtuous, middle class
Americans by means of a variety of agencies of assimilation and acculturation. Roth-

man, The State as Parent. Social Policy in the ProgressiveEra, in DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF
BENEVOLENCE 67 (D. Rothman ed. 1978).
16 L. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL:

PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN

EDUCATION, 1876-1957 (1961); L. EMPEY, JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY

AND CURRENT REFORMS (1979);J. KETT, supra note 9, at 226-27; D. ROTHMAN, supra note
2, at 206-07; S. TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1982); W. TRATrNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM (1970); R. WIEBE, supra note

8, at 169.
17 F. ALLEN, Legal Values and the RehabilitativeIdeal, in BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25-27 (1964); D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2.
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feature of every Progressive criminal justice reform was discretionary decision-making.
The Progressives' reformulation of criminal justice strategies
reflected changing ideological assumptions about the causes and
cures of crime and deviance. Positivism-the identification of antecedent causal variables producing crime and deviance-challenged
the classic formulations of crime as the product of free will.' 8 The
attribution of criminal behavior to external antecedent forces rather
than to deliberately chosen misconduct reduced an actor's moral responsibility for crime and focused efforts on the reform of the offender rather than the punishment of the offense. 19 This new
criminology, as distinguished from the old "free will," asserted a
scientific determinism of deviance and sought to identify the causal
variables producing crime and delinquency. 20 In its quest for scientific legitimacy, criminology at the turn of the century borrowed
both methodology and vocabulary from the medical profession, as
metaphors such as pathology, infection, diagnosis, and treatment
provided popular analogies for criminal justice professionals. 2 1
These deterministic interpretations of human behavior redirected
research efforts to identify the causes of crime by scientifically studying the offender, because the ability to identify the causes of crime
also implied the correlative ability to cure criminality.
The conjunction of positivistic criminology, the increasing analogies to the medical profession in the treatment of criminals, and
the growth of new social science professions gave rise to the "Rehabilitative Ideal," which was a prominent feature of all Progressive
criminal justice reforms.2 2 A flourishing rehabilitative ideal required both a belief in the malleability of human behavior and a basic moral consensus about the appropriate directions of human
change. 23 It required agreement about ends and means, the goals
of change, and the strategies to achieve these goals. The Progressives believed in the virtues of their social order and that the new
social sciences provided them with the tools for systematic human
change.
18 D. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 5 (1964); D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 50-5 1;
F. ALLEN, supra note 17.
19 E. RYERSON, supra note 2, at 22.
20 D. MATZA, supra note 18; A. PLATr, supra note 13; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2.
21 A. PLATr, supra note 13, at 18; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 56; E. RYERSON, supra
note 2; F. ALLEN, supra note 17.
22 F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL

PURPOSE 11-15 (1981); F. ALLEN, supra note 17, at 25.
23 F. ALLEN, supra note 22, at 11-15; Allen, The Decline of the RehabilitativeIdeal in Anierican CiminalJustice, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147, 150-51 (1978).
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The juvenile court was a typical Progressive criminal justice reform: a specialized bureaucratic agency staffed by experts and
designed to serve the needs of a specific category of client, namely
the child offender. The Progressives envisioned the use of indeterminate procedures by juvenile court professionals who would make
discretionary, individualized treatment decisions and who would
achieve benevolent goals and social uplift by substituting a scientific
and preventative approach for the traditional punitive purposes of
24
the criminal law.
The juvenile court movement attempted to remove children
from the adult criminal justice and corrections systems and to provide them with individualized treatment in a separate system of their
own. Under the guise of parens patriae, an emphasis on treatment,
supervision, and control, rather than punishment, allowed the state
to intervene affirmatively in the lives of more young offenders.2 5
Because the juvenile court formally rejected punishment, its ambit
of control encompassed behaviors that were previously ignored as
well as youthful activities that betokened precocious adulthood or
proto-criminality: smoking, sexuality, truancy, immorality, stub26
bornness, vagrancy, or living a wayward, idle, and dissolute life.
Its status jurisdiction reflected the normative concept of childhood
and adolescence that had taken root during the nineteenth century
and authorized pre-delinquent intervention to forestall premature
adulthood, enforce the dependent conditions of youth, and supervise their moral upbringing. 2 7 No procedural or substantive distinctions were made among youths on the basis of their criminal or noncriminal conduct, thus providing the rationale that juvenile court
proceedings were civil rather than criminal in nature.
By separating children from adult offenders, the juvenile court
also rejected the jurisprudence and procedures of criminal prosecutions. Courtroom procedures were modified to eliminate any implication of a criminal proceeding; a euphemistic vocabulary and a
physically separate court building were introduced to avoid the
24 See A. PLATr, supra note 13; E. RYERSON, supra note 2; Fox,JuvenileJustice Reform: An
HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Mack, TheJuvenile Court, 23 HARV. L.
REV. 104 (1909).
25 Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1838); See Cogan,Juvenile Law, Before and After the
Entrance of "ParensPatriae', 22 S.C.L. REV. 147, 181 (1970); Fox, supra note 24; Rendleman, ParensPatriae: From Chancery to theJuvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205, 207-10 (1971).
26 See A. P.Arr, supra note 13; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2; E. RYERSON, supra note 2.
27 See, e.g., Schlossman & Wallach, The Crime of Precocious Sexuality: FemaleJuvenile Delinquency in the Progressive Era, 48 HARV. EDUC. REV. 65, 70, 81 (1978); A. PLATr, supra note
13, at 135.
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stigma of adult prosecutions. 28 Proceedings were initiated by a petition in the welfare of the child, rather than by a criminal complaint.
Juries and lawyers were excluded, since the important issues injuvenile court proceedings were the child's background and welfare,
rather than the details surrounding the commission of a specific
crime. Judges dispensed with technical rules of evidence and formal
procedures in order to obtain all available information. To avoid
stigmatizing a youth, hearings were confidential, access to court
records was limited, and a child was found to be delinquent rather
than guilty of committing a criminal offense.
The juvenile court movement envisioned an expert judge who
was assisted by social service personnel, clinicians, and probation
officers who investigated the background of the child, identified the
sources of the child's misconduct, and developed a treatment plan
to meet the child's needs. Because their aims were benevolent, their
concern was individualized, and their intervention was guided by
science, juvenile court judges enjoyed enormous discretion to make
dispositions in the "best interests of the child." Thejuvenile court's
methodology encouraged the collection of as much information as
possible about the child, because a rational, scientific analysis of
facts presumably would reveal the proper diagnosis and prescribe
the cure. Principles of psychology and social work, rather than formal decisional rules, guided decision-makers. In the factual inquiry
about the whole child-his life, character, environment, and social
circumstances-the court gave minor significance to the specific
criminal offense committed by the child because it indicated little
about the child's "real needs."
Dispositions were indeterminate, nonproportional, and continued for the duration of the child's minority. The delicts that
brought the child before the court affected neither the intensity nor
the duration of intervention because each child's "real needs" differed, and no limits could be defined in advance. The individualized
justice of the juvenile court was as variable as that administered by
the Kadi in the marketplace "who renders his decisions without any
reference to rules or norms but in what appears to be a completely
free evaluation of the particular merits of every single case."' 29 As
reflected in juvenile sentencing practices, an extremely wide frame
of relevance and an absence of controlling rules or norms characterized this type of decision-making.
28 D. ROTHMAN,

supra note 2,

at 218; E. RYERSON, supra note 2; PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-

SION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 92 (1967).
29 D. MATZA, supra note 18, at 118.
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From its inception, juvenile court judges also had the discretion
to waive serious young offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to adult criminal courts.
[L]egislation in many states permitted juvenile court judges to transfer
any given case to an adult court, an allowance that they occasionally
took advantage of when the charge was especially serious. The Cook
County juvenile court, for example, asked grand juries to weigh the
merits of a regular indictment in about fifteen cases a year-a figure
which represented no more than one percent of its cases but did include the most notorious. Typically these boys were older (sixteen,
not twelve) and were arrested for "deeds of violence, daring holdups,
carrying guns, thefts of considerable amounts, and rape." These
transfers8 0probably muted criticism of the courts for coddling the
criminal.
Thus, transfer was always a possible disposition and reflected many
of the same sentencing considerations that animate the contemporary debate.
B.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOMESTICATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
PROCEDURAL FORMALITY AND INDIVIDUALIZED, OFFENDERORIENTED DISPOSITIONS

When the Supreme Court's Gault decision mandated procedural safeguards in the adjudication of delinquency, it focused judicial attention initially on the determination of legal guilt or
innocence and necessarily altered the object of the juvenile court's
inquiry. Following this "constitutional domestication," an offender's "soul" was no longer at issue; rather the focus was placed
on the proof of his commission of a criminal offense as a prelude to
individualized sentencing.
In Gault, the Court reviewed the history of the juvenile court
and the traditional rationales for denying procedural safeguards to
juveniles: the non-adversarial nature of the proceedings, the fact
that delinquency proceedings were civil, not criminal, and the fact
that when the state acted as parens patriae,a child was not entitled to
liberty, but to custody. 31 In rejecting these assertions, the Court observed that "unbridled discretion, however, benevolently motivated,
is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure" and
concluded that the denial of procedures frequently resulted in arbitrariness rather than "careful, compassionate, individualized treatment." 32 Although the Court hoped to retain the potential benefits
of the juvenile process, it insisted that the claims of "the juvenile
supra note 2, at 285.
31 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-17.
32 Id. at 18.
30 D. ROTHMAN,
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court process should be candidly appraised. Neither sentiment nor
folklore should cause us to shut our eyes" to the realities of recidivism, the failures of rehabilitation, the stigma of a "delinquency"
label, the breaches of confidentiality, and the arbitrariness of the
33
process.
Several features of the juvenile justice process were critical to
the imposition of procedural safeguards in Gault: the fact that
juveniles were being adjudicated delinquent for behavior that would
be deemed a criminal offense if committed by adults, the attendant
stigma of delinquency/criminal convictions, and the realities of juvenile institutional confinement.3 4 These realities motivated the
Gault Court to mandate elementary procedural safeguards such as
the right to advanced notice of charges, the right to a fair and impartial hearing, the right to assistance of counsel, which included the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the pro35
tections of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Even with the introduction of these procedural safeguards and
its critical dicta, the Supreme Court did not consider the entire procedural apparatus of juvenile justice, its jurisdictional reach, or its
dispositional consequences. Instead, the Court narrowly confined
its decision to the adjudicatory hearing at which a child is determined to be a delinquent.3 6 The Gault Court noted that the unique
procedures for processing and treating juveniles separately from
37
adults would in no way be impaired by its procedural decisions.
The Court asserted, however, that the procedural safeguards associated with the adversarial process were essential both to the determination of truth and the preservation of individual freedom through
limitations on the power of the state. The dual function of such procedures, namely, factual accuracy and the prevention of governmental oppression, is most clearly exemplified in the Court's
determination that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to
delinquency adjudications. 36 With this recognition of the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination, juvenile adjudications could no longer be characterized as either "non-criminal" or
"non-adversarial," because this fifth amendment privilege is both
the guarantor of an adversarial process and the primary mechanism
33

Id. at 21.

34 Id. at 27-28.

Id. at 31-57.
Id. at 13.
37 Id. at 21.
38 Id. at 49-50. See CriminalizingJuvenile Justice, supra note 2, at 154 & n. 46, 155 &
n.47, 156.
35
36
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for maintaining a balance between the state and the individual.3 9
In its subsequent juvenile court decisions, the Supreme Court
has elaborated upon the procedural and functional equivalence between criminal and delinquency proceedings. In In re Winship,40 the

Court decided that proof of delinquency must be established "beyond a reasonable doubt" rather than by the lower civil standards of
proof. Because no explicit constitutional provision regarding the
standard of proof exists, the Court in Winship first held that proof

beyond a reasonable doubt was a constitutional requirement in
adult criminal proceedings, and then extended that same require-

ment to juvenile proceedings. 4 1 In holding that this highest standard of proof was required, the Court emphasized that not only was
the reasonable doubt standard the primary instrument to reduce the
risk of conviction based on factual errors, but it was also an important constraint on governmental overreaching. Furthermore, the
Court asserted that the seriousness of the consequences in both the
42
adult and juvenile contexts required the highest standard of proof.

In Breed v. Jones,4 3 the Court held that the protections of the

double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment prohibited the adult
criminal reprosecution of a youth following a conviction in a juvenile court. At issue was the applicability of the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment to state proceedings, and the Court
resolved the question by establishing a functional equivalence be-

tween an adult criminal trial and a delinquency proceeding. The
Court described the virtually identical interests implicated in a de-

linquency hearing and a traditional criminal prosecution-"anxiety
and insecurity," a "heavy personal strain"-and the increased bur39

Compare Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967), with Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2994

(1986) ("The Court in Gault was obviously persuaded that the State intended to punish its
juvenile offenders ....
)(emphasis supplied).
40 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
41 Id.

at 361-67.

42 It is instructive to compare the Winship Court's treatment of the standard of proof
in delinquency cases with that required for the involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill, which requires only "clear and convincing" evidence. Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 433 (1979). The Addington Court continued its equation of criminal and delinquency proceedings by distinguishing both from involuntary commitment proceedings.
The Court [in Winship] saw no controlling difference in loss of liberty and stigma
between a conviction for an adult and a delinquency adjudication for a juvenile.
Winship recognized that the basic issue-whether the individual in fact committed a
criminal act-was the same in both proceedings. There being no meaningful distinctions between the two proceedings, we required the state to prove thejuvenile's
act and intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
...Unlike the delinquency proceeding in Winship, a civil commitment proceeding can in no sense be equated to a criminal prosecution.
Id. at 427-28.
43 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
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dens as the juvenile system has become more procedurally formalized. 4 4 In light of the potential consequences of a delinquency
proceeding, the Court concluded that there was little basis to distinguish it from a traditional adult criminal prosecution.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,4 5 the Court addressed the issue of
whether the Constitution required jury trials in state juvenile court
proceedings. The Court halted the extension of procedural parity
of juvenile court proceedings with adult criminal prosecutions by
holding that the only requirement for "fundamental fairness" in juvenile proceedings is "accurate fact-finding" and reasoned that this
requirement could be satisfied as well by a judge as by a jury. 46 In
concluding that accurate fact-finding was the only requirement for
due process in the juvenile context, the Court departed significantly
from its own prior analyses of the dual functions of procedures in
juvenile court adjudications. Those earlier decisions were premised
on two rationales: acdurate fact-finding and protection against gov47
ernmental oppression.
In its zeal to restrict juveniles' procedural rights, the McKeiver
Court insisted that the sole purpose of its earlier procedural decisions was factual accuracy, despite the fact that the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is less relevant to the factfinding process than to protection against governmental oppression.4 8 Justice Brennan belied the majority's assertion that due process was concerned only with accurate fact-finding by arguing that,
while the right to a jury trial protected against governmental oppression, a public trial which assured visibility and accountability
could also perform that safeguard function. 49 Finally, the McKeiver
Court rejected the argument that the inbred, closed nature of the
juvenile court would prejudice the accuracy of fact-finding by invoking the traditional juvenile court mythology. According to the
Court, concern about procedural safeguards, such as jury trials, ignores "every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates." 50
The result in McKeiver was clearly dictated by the Court's concern that the right to ajury trial would be the procedural safeguard
44

Id. at 528-29.

45 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
46

Id. at 543.

47 See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64; Gault, 387 U.S. at 47; Reference ofJuvenile Of-

fenders, supra note 6, at 601-7.
48 CrininalizingJuvenile Justice, supra note 2, at 159.
49 See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 553-57 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
50 Id. at 550-51.
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most disruptive of the traditional juvenile court and its adjudicative
practices. 51 The Court's stated reason for denying jury trials to

juveniles was the adverse impact that this right would have on the
informality, flexibility, and confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings. The Court realized that the imposition of this last remaining
formality of the criminal process would make the juvenile court vir-

tually indistinguishable from a criminal court and would raise the
more basic question of whether there is any need for a separate juvenile court at all.
Unfortunately, the McKeiver Court did not analyze the crucial
distinctions between treatment in juvenile courts and punishment in

criminal courts that justified the differences in procedural safeguards,52 noting simply that the ideal juvenile court system is "an
intimate, informal protective proceeding." 53 Nor did the Court

have before it a factual record of dispositional practices to use in
deciding whether the intervention to which a youth was subjected
54
was punishment or treatment.

The Progressives who created the juvenile court envisioned a
51 Id. The Court's results in McKeiver also reflected its disquiet with the incorporation implications of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which constitutionally
required jury trials in state criminal proceedings. In several subsequent decisions, the
Court attempted to reduce the administrative impact ofjuries by authorizing six-person
juries, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), and non-unanimous jury verdicts,
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972);Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
52 In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, the Court held that fundamental fairness in
adult criminal proceedings required both factual accuracy and protection against governmental oppression. "[A] jury of his peers gave [the defendant] an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased,
or eccentric judge." Id. at 156.
53 See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550.
54 See, e.g., B. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN INSTITUTIONS (1977) (prison-like conditions of confinement in juvenile correctional facilities);
CriminalizihgJuvenile Justice, supra note 2, at 246-62, 259 n.457.
In Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2994-95 (1986), the Court denied petitioner the
protections of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination in a sexually
dangerous person commitment proceeding. Because the privilege is only available if the
state purports to "punish," the Court's ruling was based, in part, on petitioner's failure
to disprove the state's assertion that it provided treatment, rather than punishment.
Petitioner has not demonstrated, and the record does not suggest, that "sexually
dangerous persons" in Illinois are confined under conditions incompatible with the
State's asserted interest in treatment. Had petitioner shown, for example, that the
confinement of such persons imposes on them a regimen which is essentially identical to that imposed upon felons with no need for psychiatric care, this might well be
a different case. But the record here tells us little or nothing about the regimen at
the psychiatric center, and it certainly does not show that there are no relevant differences between confinement there and confinement in the other parts of the maximum security prison complex .... We therefore cannot say that the conditions of
petitioner's confinement themselves amount to "punishment" and thus render
"criminal" the proceedings which led to confinement.
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benevolent treatment agency staffed by expert judges and assisted
by social services personnel. They emphasized informality, flexibility, and discretionary dispositions in the "best interests of the
child." Despite the procedural formalization of the juvenile court in
Gault, the Supreme Court in McKeiver remained ideologically committed to the traditional "treatment" rationale of the juvenile
court.55 By uncritically accepting the assertion that juvenile courts
are "rehabilitative" rather than punitive, the Court did not inquire
further about either the nature of juvenile court treatment that differed from traditional criminal law punishment or the need for procedural protections against governmental oppression.
Despite the Supreme Court's reluctance to hasten the demise of
the juvenile court in McKeiver, its earlier decisions in Gault and Winship imported the adversarial model and the primacy of legal guilt as
a constitutional prerequisite to coercive intervention and drastically
altered the form and function of the juvenile court. By emphasizing
procedural regularity in the determination of criminal guilt as a prerequisite to a delinquency disposition, the Court altered the focus of
the juvenile court from the Progressive's emphasis on the "real
needs" of a child to proof of the commission of criminal acts. Increasingly, the sentencing framework ofjuvenile courts has also reflected the substantive goals of the criminal law.
III.

THE PRINCIPLE OF OFFENSE IN JUVENILE COURT-JUST
DESERTS IN SENTENCING PRACTICES

Justice White's concurrence in McKeiver emphasized the perceived punishment/treatment distinctions between juvenile and
criminal proceedings. Whereas the criminal law punishes morally
responsible actors for making blameworthy choices, the deterministic assumptions of the juvenile justice system regard juveniles as less
culpable for their criminal misdeeds. Justice White stated that the
indeterminate length of juvenile dispositions and the "eschewing
[of] blameworthiness and punishment for evil choices" satisfied him
that "there remained differences of substance between criminal and
juvenile courts." 56 Justice Stewart's dissent in Gault articulated a
similar distinction between the sentencing practices in the juvenile
and adult criminal justice systems. Justice Stewart observed that "a
juvenile proceeding's whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court.
The object of the one is correction of a condition. The object of the
55

See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547.
552-53 (White, J., concurring).

56 Id. at
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other is conviction and punishment for a criminal act." 5 7 This perception was reflected in the implicit assumption of the McKeiver
Court that juveniles receive only positive rehabilitative treatment
which requires no further special safeguards against governmental
intervention. By contrast, retributive criminal punishment in the
adult criminal process requires additional procedural guarantees to
prevent governmental oppression.
The fundamental justification in juvenile jurisprudence for denying jury trials and, more basically, for maintaining separate juvenile and adult justice systems is based on the differences between
punishment and treatment. Punishment involves state-imposed
58
burdens on an individual who has violated legal prohibitions.
Treatment, by contrast, focuses on the mental health, status, or welfare of the individual, rather than on the commission of prohibited
59
acts.
Punishment and treatment can be conceptualized as mutually
exclusive goals because of the backward-looking nature of punishment and the forward-looking emphasis of therapy. 60 Punishment
imposes unpleasant consequences on offenders because of their
past offenses; therapy seeks to alleviate undesirable conditions and
thereby improve the offender's life in the future. Treatment assumes that certain antecedent factors are responsible for the individual's undesirable condition and that steps can be taken to alter
those factors. Indeed, this tenet is central to the positive criminol61
ogy underlying the rehabilitative ideal of the juvenile court.
In analyzing juvenile court sentencing practices, it is useful to
examine whether the sentencing decision is based on considerations
of the offense or of the offender. If the sentence is based on the
characteristics of the offense, the sentence is usually determinate
and proportional, and has a goal of retribution or deterrence. In
the case of waiver to criminal courts for punishment, offense-based
considerations dominate if the seriousness of the present offense
and prior record control the decision. Such a decision is based on
an assessment of past conduct. If a sentence is based on the characteristics of the offender, however, it is typically open-ended, nonproportional and indeterminate, and has a goal of rehabilitation or
Gault, 387 U.S. at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBLITY 4-5 (1968).
59 F. ALLEN, supra note 22, at 2-3; H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
57
58

CRIMINAL SANCTION

23-28 (1968); ALLEN, supra note 17, at 25.
60 Gardner, supra note 5, at 793 n. 18, 815-16; CriminalizingJuvenileJustice,supra note 2,

at 248 nn.415-416.
61 D. MATZA, supra note 18, at 3.
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incapacitation. 62 In the context of waiver decisions, clinical assessments of the individual offender's "amenability to treatment" or
"dangerousness" predominate. The decision is based on a prediction of an offender's future course. Thus, waiver statutes reflect the
same dispositional tensions between individualized evaluations of
the offender and more mechanistic dispositions based on the characteristics of the offense that pervade other sentencing schema.
It is also useful to distinguish the bases on which such dispositions are made. Matza 63 has described the principle of offense as a
principle of equality: the treating of similar cases in a similar fashion based on a relatively narrowly defined frame of relevance.
The principle of equality refers to a specific set of substantive criteria
that are awarded central relevance and, historically, to a set of considerations that were specifically and momentously precluded. Its meaning, especially in criminal proceedings, has been to give a central and
unrivaled position in the framework of relevance to considerations of
offense and conditions closely related to offense like prior record, and
64
to more or less preclude considerations of status and circumstance.
By contrast, the principle of individualized justice differs from
the principle of offense in two fundamental ways.
First, [the principle of individualized justice] is much more inclusive:
it contains many more items in its framework of relevance.
...

The principle of individualized justice suggests that disposi-

tion is to be guided by a full understanding of the
client's personal and
'65
social character and by his "individual needs."
Rather than being confined to characteristics of the offense, individualization encompasses every characteristic of the offender. In addition, "the kinds of criteria it includes are more diffuse than those
commended in the principle of offense....

The consequence of the

principle of individualized justice has been mystification." 66 By
62 "The distinction between indeterminate and determinate sentencing is not semantic, but indicates fundamentally different public policies. Indeterminate sentencing is
based upon notions of rehabilitation, while determinate sentencing is based upon a desire for retribution or punishment." In re Felder, 93 Misc. 2d 369, 374, 402 N.Y.S.2d
528, 533 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978). See generally, N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT
13-20 (1974); H. PACKER, supra note 59; REPORT OF TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT I 1-14 (1976); A. VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 11-26 (1976) [hereinafter DOINGJUSTICE]; A. VON HIRSCH, PAST
OR FUTURE CRIMES (1986). In analyzing juvenile dispositions, it is useful to contrast
offender-oriented dispositions, which are indeterminate and non-proportional, with offense-based dispositions, which are determinate, proportional, and related to characteristics
63
64
65
66

of the offense.
D. MATZA, supra note 18, at 113-14.
Id (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 114-15 (emphasis supplied).

Id.
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deeming all personal and social characteristics as relevant without
assigning controlling significance to any one factor, individualized
justice relies heavily on the "professional judgment" of juvenile
67
court administrators.
In the adult dispositional framework, determinate sentencing
based on the offense has increasingly superseded indeterminate
sentencing, and "just deserts" has replaced rehabilitation as the underlying sentencing rationale. 68 The Progressives' optimistic assumptions about human malleability are challenged daily by the
observation that rehabilitation programs do not consistently rehabilitate and by the volumes of empirical evaluations that question
both the effectiveness of treatment programs and the "scientific"
underpinnings of those who administer the enterprise. 6 9 "Either
because of scientific ignorance or institutional incapacities, a rehabilitative technique is lacking; we do not know how to prevent criminal recidivism by changing the characters and behavior of
70
offenders.
"Just deserts" advocates reject rehabilitation as a justification
for intervention because of the discretionary power an indeterminate sentencing scheme vests in presumed experts, the inability of
such experts to justify their differential treatment of similarly situated offenders, and the inequalities, disparities, and injustices that
67 Id. at

116.

68 See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITrEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE

D. FOGEL, WE ARE
(2nd ed. 1979); N.

45-53 (1971);
260-72
(1979);

THE LIVING PROOF: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS
MORRIS, supra note 62, at 45-50 ; R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS

DOING JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 49-55.
69 Martinson, What lWorks? Questions andAnswers about Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST

22, 25 (1974)("With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have
been reported so far have had no appreciable affect on recidivism."); L. SECHEREST, S.
WHITE & E. BROWN, THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (1979); G. KASSEBAUM, D. WARD & D. WILNER, PRISON TREATMENT AND PAROLE SURVIVAL (1971). In
another survey of correctional evaluations, Greenberg, The CorrectionalEffects of Corrections: A Surey of Evaluations, in CORRECTIONS AND PUNISHMENT 111, 140 (D. Greenberg
ed. 1977), Greenberg concludes:
This survey indicates that many correctional dispositions are failing to reduce recidivism, and it thus confirms the general thrust of... Martinson....

Much of what is

now done in the name of "corrections" may serve other functions, but the prevention of return to crime is not one of them. Here and there a few modest results
alleviate the monotony, but most of these results are modest and are obtained
through evaluations seriously lacking in rigor. The blanket assertion that "nothing
works" is an exaggeration, but not by very much.
I never thought it likely that most of these programs would succeed in
preventing much return to crime. Where the theoretical assumptions of programs
are made explicit, they tend to border on the preposterous. More often they are not
made explicit, and we should be little surprised if hit or miss efforts fail.
Id.
70

F.

ALLEN,

supra note 22, at 34.
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result from individualized sentences. "Just deserts" sentencing,
with its strong retributive foundation, punishes offenders according
to their past behavior, rather than on the basis of who they are or
may be predicted to become. Similarly situated offenders are defined and sanctioned equally on the basis of objective characteristics
7
such as seriousness of offense, culpability, or criminal history. '
As the same changes in sentencing philosophy emerge in the
juvenile process, the renewed interest in "just deserts" requires a
re-examination of the rationale of McKeiver. The inability of proponents of juvenile rehabilitation to demonstrate the effectiveness of
parenspatriae intervention has led an increasing number of states to
incorporate "just deserts" sentencing principles in their juvenile
justice systems. As juvenile courts base sentencing decisions more
frequently on the basis of the principle of offense rather than individualized justice, the McKeiver Court's "treatment" rationale becomes less tenable, and the continued existence of a separate
juvenile court appears more questionable.
The issue of punishment based on characteristics of the offense
versus treatment based on consideration of the offender can be addressed, in part, by examining juvenile court sentencing practices in
the waiver decision, namely, the substantive bases on which a youth
is transferred to criminal court for prosecution and punishment as
an adult. This examination reveals that, despite the traditional rhetoric of rehabilitation, there is a very strong legislative trend in which
the waiver/sentencing practice of the contemporary juvenile court
increasingly reflect the punitive character of the criminal law and the
principle of offense.
A.

WAIVER OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS FOR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

The appropriate disposition of persistent or violent young offenders is one of the most difficult sentencing issues confronting the
juvenile justice system. 7 2 The waiver decision is a form of sentencing decision that represents a choice between the explicitly punitive
dispositions of adult criminal courts and the nominally rehabilitative
dispositions of juvenile courts. 7 3 Juvenile courts have traditionally
assigned primary importance to individualized treatment, whereas
the criminal law accords far greater significance to the seriousness
of the offense committed and attempts to proportion punishment
71 See supra notes 62, 68.
72

See, e.g.,

supra note 7; YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BEsupra note 7; Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6; Dismantling

READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY,

TWEEN Two WORLDS,

the "Rehabilitative Ideal", supra note 3.
73 See, e.g., Whitebread & Batey, supra note 7, at 207.
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accordingly. These differences between juvenile and criminal
courts' penal philosophies are most visible in juvenile waiver
proceedings.
Most legislatures have adopted some statutory mechanism to
transfer juvenile offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile
courts to that of adult criminal courts.74 Two legislative vehiclesjudicial waiver and legislative offense exclusion-pose the alternative sentencing policy choices most starkly. 7 5 The most prevalent
practice in virtually all jurisdictions is judicial waiver; a judge may
waive juvenile court jurisdiction on a discretionary basis after a
hearing on the youth's amenability to treatment or threat to public
safety. Thejuvenile court judge's case-by-case clinical evaluation of
a youth's amenability to treatment or his dangerousness reflects the
individualized, discretionary sentencing practices that have been the
hallmark of the juvenile court.
The other transfer mechanism, in which the legislative definition of juvenile court jurisdiction excludes youths charged with certain offenses from juvenile courts, is termed legislative waiver or
offense exclusion. Legislative exclusion reflects the retributive, of76
fense-oriented values of the criminal law.
Both judicial waiver and legislative offense exclusion statutes attempt to answer essentially the same questions: Who are the serious juvenile offenders? How are they identified? Which system will
deal with them? Each type of waiver mechanism emphasizes different information in a determination of whether certain juvenile offenders should be handled as adults. According to Matza's
paradigm, each mechanism has a different "framework of
74 YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 7; Reference ofJuvenile
Offenders, supra note 6, at 523.
75 A third mechanism for removing juvenile offenders from the juvenile system is
prosecutorial waiver, or concurrent jurisdiction between juvenile and criminal courts
over certain offenses. Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6, at 521 n.20; YOUTH IN
ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 7; Thomas & Bilchik, Prosecuting
Juveniles in CriminalCourts: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
439 (1985). In concurrent jurisdiction states, such as Nebraska, Wyoming, Arkansas,
and Florida, the prosecutor's charging decision determines whether a case will be heard
in the juvenile or adult forum. Because this Article focuses primarily on the differences
between the juvenile and adult justice systems and their respective emphases on offenders and offenses in sentencing, a separate discussion of prosecutorial waiver will be
omitted. To the extent that the prosecutor's decision to charge certain offenses in criminal courts divests the juvenile court ofjurisdiction, however, this waiver mechanism will
be treated as a sub-category of offense based decision making. Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6, at 557-61, 558 n.139.
76 See, e.g., Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6, at 556-71; Delinquent Careersand
CriminalPolicy, supra note 6, at 202-05.
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77

relevance."
The critical reassessment of individualized sentencing practices
in adult courts raises troubling questions about the validity of the
clinical diagnoses or predictions relied upon in waiver decisions and
the propriety of delegating fundamental issues of sentencing policy
to the- discretionary judgments of social service personnel and
judges. Proponents ofjust deserts in sentencing contend that there
is no valid or reliable clinical basis upon which juvenile court judges
can make accurate amenability or dangerousness determinations
and that the standardless discretion afforded to judges results in inconsistent and discriminatory application. 78 This critique of individualized sentencing in the waiver context has resulted in two types of
legislation. One type defines youths below the maximum age ofjuvenile court jurisdiction as adults by automatically excluding from
the juvenile justice system those persons who possess certain combinations of present offense and prior record; the other type of legislation places an increased emphasis on the significance of the
offense as a dispositional criterion in a judicial waiver proceeding.
The analysis of waiver as a sentencing decision addresses two
interrelated policy issues: the bases for sentencing practices within
juvenile courts and the relationship between juvenile court and
adult criminal court sentencing practices. The first issue implicates
individualized sentencing decisions and the operational tension between discretion and the rule of law. The second issue focuses on
rationalizing social control responses to serious or chronic offenders
across the two systems. By constraining judicial sentencing discretion and improving the fit between waiver decisions and criminal
court sentencing practices through the principle of offense, legislatures are increasingly using offense criteria to deal with both issues
simultaneously.
1. Judicial Waiver-ProceduralFormality and Individualized Dispositions
In Kent v. United States,79 the Supreme Court mandated that procedural due process must be observed in judicial waiver determinations, thereby formalizing this sentencing decision. The Kent
Court's formalization of the juvenile waiver hearing anticipated
many of the same procedural safeguards afforded by the Court's
later formalization of delinquency adjudications in Gault.80 Subse77 D. MATZA, supra note 18, at 114-15.
78 Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note

6, at 529-56. See also infra notes 88-101 and

accompanying text.
79 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
80

In Kent, the Court concluded that the loss of the special protections of the juvenile
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quently, in Breed v. Jones,8s the Court applied the double jeopardy
provisions of the Constitution to the adjudication of juvenile offenses, thereby requiring the states to make the juvenile/adult dispositional determination before proceeding against a youth on the
merits of the charge.
Although Kent and Breed provide the formal procedural framework within which the judicial waiver/sentencing decision occurs,
the substantive bases of the decisions present the principal difficulty
of discretionary judicial waiver. Most jurisdictions provide for discretionary waiver based on a juvenile court judge's assessment of a
youth's amenability to treatment or dangerousness, as indicated by
age, the treatment prognosis, and the threat to others, as reflected
in the seriousness of the present offense and prior record. 82 Legislatures specify waiver factors with varying degrees of precision and
typically adopt the substantive criteria appended to the Supreme
83
Court's decision in Kent.
court private proceedings, confidential records, and protection from the stigma of a
criminal conviction through a waiver decision was a "critically important" action that
required a hearing, assistance of counsel, access to social investigations and other
records, and written findings and conclusions capable of review by a higher court. Id. at
553-63. "[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance of
counsel, without a statement of reasons." Id. at 554. See generally PAULSEN, Kent v. United
States: The ConstitutionalContext ofJuvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167.

81 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
82 See, e.g., Delinquent Careers and CriminalPolicy, supra note 6, at 198; Reference ofJuvenile

Offenders, supra note 6.

83 Although Kent was decided on procedural grounds, the Supreme Court, in an appendix to its opinion, indicated some of the substantive criteria that a juvenile court
might consider:
An offense falling within the statutory limitations ... will be waived if it has prosecutive merit and if it is heinous or of an aggravated character, or-even though less
serious-if it represents a pattern of repeated offenses which indicate that the juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation underJuvenile Court procedures, or if the public
needs the protection afforded by such action.
The determinative factors which will be considered by the Judge in deciding
whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over such offenses will be waived are the
following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the
protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property,
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury
resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence
upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment. ...
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court
when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults. ...
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous con-
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As sentencing criteria, the assessment of a youth's amenability
to treatment or dangerousness implicates some of the most fundamental and difficult issues of penal policy and juvenile jurisprudence. The underlying legislative assumptions that there are
effective treatment programs for serious or persistent juvenile offenders, classification systems that differentiate the treatment potential or dangerousness of various youths, and validated and reliable
diagnostic tools that enable a clinician or juvenile court judge to
determine the proper disposition for a particular youth are all highly
problematic and controversial. 8 4 Similarly, legislation authorizing a
judge to waive juvenile court jurisdiction because a youth poses a
threat to public safety requires the judge to predict the youth's dangerousness despite compelling evidence that the "capacity to predict future criminal behavior [is] quite beyond our present technical
85
ability."
In short, judicial waiver statutes that are couched in terms of
amenability to treatment or dangerousness are simply broad,
standardless grants of sentencing discretion characteristic of the individualized, offender-oriented dispositional statutes of the juvenile
court. The addition of long lists of supposed substantive standards,
such as that appended by the Supreme Court in Kent, does not provide objective indicators to guide discretion. "[T]he substantive
standards are highly subjective, and the large number of factors that
may be taken into consideration provides ample opportunity for selection and emphasis in discretionary decisions that shape the outcome of individual cases." 86 Indeed, such catalogues of factors
reinforce juvenile court judges' exercise of virtually unreviewable
discretion by allowing selective emphasis of one set of factors or
87
another to justify any disposition.
tacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts
and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to
the Juvenile Court.
383 U.S. 566-67 app. These factors have been adopted by a number of jurisdictions
through either legislation or judicial gloss, as indicated in Table 1.
84 See, e.g., Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6, at 529-56; Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal", supra note 3, at 170-84; Delinquent Careersand CriminalPolicy, supra note 6,
at 198-200. See also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
85 N. MORRIS, supra note 62, at 62. See also Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6, at

540-46; Morris & Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6
86 Zimring, Notes toward a jurisprudenceof Waiver, in
note 7, at 195.

CRIME &JUsTICE 1 (1985).
READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY,

Supra

87 TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG
OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME

56

(1978), notes that "[c]ollectively, 'lists' of
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Like individualized sentencing statutes, the subjectivity inherent in waiver administration allows a variety of inequities and disparities to occur. The empirical reality is that judges cannot
administer these discretionary statutes on a consistent, evenhanded
basis. 8 8 Within a single jurisdiction, waiver statutes are inconsistently interpreted and applied from county to county and from court
to court.8 9 Hamparian's nationwide analysis of waiver in 1978 provides substantial evidence that judicial waiver practices are inherently arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory. 90 Among the states
that rely on judicial waiver for the transfer decision, the rates of
waiver vary from a high of 13.5 to a low of .07 per 10,000 youths at
risk; youths in Oregon have nearly 200 times the probability of being waived for trial as adults as do youths in Montana. 9 t Fagan,
Piper, and Forst analyzed waiver decisions involving a sample of violent youths in four different jurisdictions and concluded that there
92
were no uniform criteria guiding the transfer decision.
What we found was a rash of inconsistent judicial waiver decisions,
both within and across sites. Inconsistent and standardless decisions
for youth retained in juvenile court are not surprising in ajudicial context which cherishes individualized justice ....

But for youth who may

be tried and convicted in criminal court and subjected to years of imprisonment in a secure
institution, such subjective decision making is
93
no longer justified.
Fagan and his collegues tested seven offense and offender variables
to identify determinants of the transfer decision within a sample of
violent youths. They reported that "[n]either multivariate analysis
this length rarely serve to limit discretion or regularize procedure. By giving emphasis
to one or two of the guidelines, a judge can usually justify a decision either way."
88 See, e.g., YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 7; Reference of
Juvenile Offenders, supra note 6, at 546-56.
89 See, e.g., Edwards, The Casefor Abolishing Fitness Hearings in Juvenile Court, 17 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 595, 611-12 (1977) (county by county disparity); J. P. HEUSER, JUVENILES
ARRESTED FOR SERIOUS FELONY CRIMES IN OREGON AND "REMANDED" TO ADULT CRIMINAL COURTS: A STATISTICAL STUDY 30 (1985) (county by county variation in Oregon-"it

appears that some counties may be over- or under-represented in terms of the proportion of cases per unit of risk population."); SUPREME COURT JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY
COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT 61-78 (1976)(waiver is used
for three different purposes in different parts of the state); YOUTH IN ADULT COURT:
BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 7 (Northeast Region; North Central Region; Southeast Region; South Central Region; West Region (county by county disparity within
states)).
90 YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 7, at 102.
91 Id. at 104-05.
92 J. Fagan, E. Piper, & M. Forst, The Juvenile Court and Violent Youth: Determinants of the Transfer Decisions (forthcoming) [hereinafter cited as Juvenile Court and
Violent Youth].
93 Id. at 21.
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nor simple explorations identified strong or consistent determinants
of the judicial transfer decision. Except for a relationship between
extensive prior offense history and the transfer decision, none of the
identified variables could significantly describe differences between
'94
youths who were or were not transferred.
In addition to "justice by geography," there is evidence that a
juvenile's race may influence the waiver decision. 9 5 Hamparian reported that, nationally, 39% of all youths transferred in 1978 were
Black and that, in eleven states, minority youths constituted the majority of juveniles waived. 96 Eigen reported an interracial effect in
transfers; black youths who murder white victims were significantly
more at risk for waiver. 97 In their study of transfer of violent youths,
Fagan, Forst, and Vivona also found substantial disparities in the
rates of minority and white offenders. Although there was no direct
evidence of sentencing discrimination, "it appears that the effects of
9' 8
race are indirect, but visible nonetheless."
Bortner concluded that a juvenile court's organizational and
political considerations explain more about the waiver decision than
does the inherent dangerousness or intractability of a youth. 99
[P]olitical and organizational factors, rather than concern for public
safety, account for the increasing rate of remand. In evidencing a willingness to relinquish jurisdiction over a small percentage of its clientele, and by portraying these juveniles as the most intractable and the
greatest threat to public safety, the juvenile justice system not only
94 Id. at 19.

95 Eigen, The Determinants and Impact ofJurisdictionalTransfer in Philadelphia, in

READ-

INGS IN PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 7, at 333; Keiter, Criminal or Delinquent: A Study of
Juvenile Cases Transferredto the Criminal Court, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 528 (1973); YOUTH IN
ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 7, at 104-05.
96 YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 7, at 104-05. Without

being able to control for the seriousness of the present offense and prior record, it is not
possible to ascribe the disproportionate overrepresentation of minority youths in waiver
proceedings to racial discrimination.
97 Eigen, supra note 95. Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987)(statistical
evidence that black defendants whose victims are white are disproportionately at risk for
execution does not result in violations of due process or equal protection). Zimring, in
Notes Toward a jurisprudenceof Waiver, in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 7, at 193,
described the waiver of serious juvenile offenders as "the capital punishment ofjuvenile
justice." Zimring observed that "[c]apital punishment in criminal justice and waiver in
juvenile justice share four related characteristics: 1) low incidence; 2) prosecutorial and

judicial discretion; 3) ultimacy; and 4) inconsistency with the premises that underlie the
system's other interventions." Id. See also infra notes 172-207 and accompanying text, in
which the implications of waiver for capital punishment are addressed directly.
98 Fagan, Forst & Vivona, RacialDeterminants of theJudicialTransfer Decision: Prosecuting
Violent Youth in Criminal Court, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 259, 276 (1987) [hereinafter Racial
Determinants ofJudicial Transfer].
99 Bortner, TraditionalRhetoric, OrganizationalRealities: Remand ofJuvenile to Adult Court,
32 CRIME & DELINQ. 53 (1986).
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creates an effective symbolic gesture regarding protection of the public but it also advances its territorial interest in maintaining jurisdiction
over the vast majority of juveniles and deflecting more encompassing
criticisms of the entire system. 100

Idiosyncratic differences in judicial philosophies and the locale
of a waiver hearing are far more significant for the ultimate adulthood decision than is any inherent quality of the criminal act or
characteristic of the offending youth. 10 1 The inconsistency in the
interpretation and application of waiver statutes is hardly surprising
in view of the inherent subjectivity of the dispositional issue, the lack
of effective guidelines to structure the decision, and the latent as
well as manifest functions the process serves. In short, judicial
waiver statutes reveal all of the defects characteristic of individualized, discretionary sentencing schema.
2.

Legislative Exclusion of Offenses-Offense as
a Determinant of Dispositions

Legislative waiver, the principal alternative to judicial waiver,
excludes from juvenile court jurisdiction youths who are charged
with specified offenses or who have particular records of prior adjudications in conjunction with a present offense. Because juvenile
courts are created solely by statute, legislatures are free to modify
the court's jurisdiction in a variety of ways. Despite both due process and equal protection challenges to statutes that exclude youths
who commit certain offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction, appellate courts have consistently sustained these legislative
02
classifications. 1
Statutes mandating the prosecution of a youth as an adult on
the basis of the offense charged or offense history are inconsistent
with the individualized rehabilitative philosophy of juvenile courts.
Although legislatures may subordinate individualized treatment
considerations to other social control policy objectives, it is often
not apparent which of several alternative sentencing policies are being pursued in the redefining of juvenile court jurisdiction.
Commentators contend that the primary justification for waiver
is the need for minimum lengths of confinement substantially in excess of the maximum sanctions available in juvenile court.' 0 3
100 Id. at 69-70.
101 YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETIVEEN Two WORLDS, supra note

7, at 105.

102 Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 6, at 556-71.
103 Zimring, Notes Toward a Jurisprudenceof Waiver, in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY, supra
note 7, at 201. See generally, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS 6-7, 39-42 (1980).
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[T]he justification for waiver is singular: transfer to criminal court is
necessary when the maximum punishment available in juvenile court is
clearly inadequate... [T]he standard for making a waiver decision is a
determination that the maximum social control available in juvenile
court falls far short of the minimum social control necessary if a 10partic4
ular offender is guilty of the serious crime he is charged with.
Fagan reported that the length of time from age at offense to the
maximum age jurisdictional limit, rather than pridr record, dictates
the judicial transfer decision; judges transfer juveniles if the seriousness of the offense requires a longer sentence than that available in
the juvenile court. 10 5
If the rationale for adult prosecution is the need for minimum
lengths of confinement substantially in excess of the juvenile court's
maximum age jurisdiction, then the appropriate theories of punishment to structure the choice of waiver criteria are retribution and
selective incapacitation. Packer notes the importance of an integrated theory of punishment that emphasizes both culpability and
prevention and results in a combination of retributive and utilitarian
theories of punishment.1 0 6 For Packer, retributive punishment is a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition because it limits the imposition of criminal sanctions to the culpable and blameworthy and introduces a degree of certainty to the process. 10 7 Equally important,
retribution constitutes a limiting factor by confining the issue of
waiver to the most serious types of criminal conduct for which the
longest terms of confinement are authorized.
Retribution alone, however, is an inadequate theory for the selection of waiver criteria both because it is overly inclusive and because the infliction of harm without any offsetting utilitarian gain is
undesirable. Consistent with the underlying rationale for waiver, selective incapacitation is an appropriate theory to couple with retribution because there is a limited class of offenders whose persistent
history of wrongdoing is also indicative of the inadequacy of the
sanctions available in the juvenile court.1 0 8 A pattern of offenses
may evidence greater culpability; the actor was on notice that his
behavior was condemned yet repeated it. In the allocation of scarce
penal resources, selective incapacitation of persistent offenders constitutes a reasonable rationing strategy and may have the incidental
104 Zimring, Notes Toward ajurisprudenceof Waiver, in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY, supra
note 7, at 201.
105 The Juvenile Court and Violent Youth, supra note 92, at 11.
106 H. PACKER, supra note 59, at 62-70.
107 Id. at 68.
108 Cohen, Incapacitation as a Strategyfor Crime Control. Possibilitiesand Pitfalls, 5 CRIME &
JUSTICE 1 (1984).
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benefit of preventing some future crimes.' 0 9 Although selective incapacitation attempts to identify those offenders with a substantially
greater probability of future criminal involvement, juveniles waived
pursuant to this strategy are waived not on the basis of a prediction
regarding the future, but rather because of their past conduct. By
confining the predictor criteria to past criminal history, many of the
legitimate civil liberty-oriented objections to over-prediction, false
positives, and preventive incarceration may be avoided. 110
Translating these jurisprudential premises into legislative
waiver criteria requires an explicit acknowledgement of the actual
sentencing goals being pursued. A legislature could rationally conclude that an older youth who commits a particularly heinous or serious offense deserves to be treated as an adult, and it could exclude
such a youth from the juvenile system on the basis of culpability and
the seriousness of the present offense.
If the legislative goal in redefining juvenile court jurisdiction is
to selectively incapacitate chronic offenders, then excluding offenders solely on the basis of the seriousness of their present offense
may not be the most effective strategy. Offenders who are both persistent and violent are legislatively distinguishable from their less
criminally active peers on the basis of chronic criminal activity, but
not on the basis of the seriousness of any given act. From the available evidence on the development of delinquent careers, it appears
that many youths engage simultaneously in both trivial and serious
violations of the law and that police arrest and process youths primarily as a function of the frequency, rather than the seriousness, of
their delinquent behavior.1 1 ' If selective incapacitation is the goal,
then a youth initially apprehended for a serious offense may not be
different from a youth who is apprehended for a minor offense and
whose serious delinquency remains hidden. The seriousness of a
first offense provides little basis for distinguishing those youths who
are likely to recidivate from those who are not." l 2 The number of
contacts a young offender has with the juvenile justice system is the
most reliable indicator of the likelihood of future criminality.
109

A.

BLUMSTEIN, J. COHEN &

D.

NAGIN, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMAT-

ING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (1978); P. GREENWOOD, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1982); COHEN, supra note 107.
110 See DOING JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 84; Delinquent Careersand CriminalPolicy, supra
note 6; Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6.
11 1 See, e.g., M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT
(1972) [hereinafter cited as DELINQUENCY IN BIRTH COHORT].

112 Id. See also, Wolfgang, From Boy To Man-From Delinquency To Crime, in THE SERIOUS
JUVENILE OFFENDER 161 (1977); D. HAMPARIAN, R. SCHUSTER, S. DINITZ & J. CONRAD,
THE VIOLENT FEW (1978); P. STRASBURG, VIOLENT DELINQUENTS (1978).
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Although most youths desist after one or two contacts, once youths
become chronic offenders, there is a substantial probability that they
will continue to commit delinquent acts.1 13 Studies of the development of delinquent careers suggest that serious offenders are best
identified by their persistence rather than by the nature of their initial offense. 1 4 The criminal career research indicates that young offenders do not "specialize" in particular types of crime, that
violence occurs within an essentially random pattern of delinquent
behavior, and that a small number of chronic delinquents are responsible for many offenses and most of the violent offenses committed by juveniles. 1 15 Although it is not possible to predict
violence on the basis of prior offense records, a prior record of vio6
lence or crime is the best indicator of such behavior in the future. 1
Thus, a legislature attempting to identify serious offenders should
emphasize an offender's cumulative record rather than just the seri17
ousness of the current offense.'
Legislative defining adulthood requires both an empirical judgment and a value choice. The empirical judgment involves an effort
to identify the persistent and serious offender by selecting offense
criteria that will differentiate between the relatively few young offenders who should be prosecuted as adults and the vast majority of
juveniles who should remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. The most reliable and relevant criteria on which to base
these judgments are the present offense and the prior record, which
are combined to highlight the differences between the two classes of
juvenile offenders.
Selecting the criteria for adulthood also entails an explicit legislative value choice about the quantity and quality of deviance that
will be tolerated within the juvenile system before a more punitive
response is mandated. In most cases, youths will not receive better
rehabilitative services in the adult correctional system than are available in the juvenile system. Therefore, the decision to transfer a
youth to the adult process must ultimately be defensible on the
grounds of retribution or selective incapacitation. Incarceration is
113 See CRIMINAL

CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS"

(A. BLUMSTEIN,

J. COHEN, J. ROTH

& C. VISHER EDS. 1986) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL CAREERS]; DELINQUENCY IN A
BIRTH COHORT, supra note I 11, at 65-87; Petersilia, Criminal Career Research: A Review of
Recent Evidence, 2 CRIME &JUSTICE 321, 321-22 (1980).
114 See supra notes 111-13.
115 See supra notes 111-13.
116 See, e.g., Greenwood, Differences in CriminalBehavior and Court Responses AmongJuvenile
and Youth Adult Defendants, 7 CRIME &JUSTICE 164 (1986).
117 See Delinquent Careers and criminal Policy, supra note 6, at 195; Reference of Juvenile
Offenders, supra note 6, at 614; Greenwood, supra note 116.
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necessarily a last resort; some offenders, however, do deserve it, and
the community needs a respite from their predation. From the community's perspective, the principal values of exclusion are: enhanced community protection through the greater security and
longer sentences available in the adult system, increased general deterrence though greater certainty and visibility of consequences,
and reaffirmation of fundamental norms. Because most offenders,
adults and juveniles alike, do not require penal incarceration, legislative exclusion is appropriate only when a juvenile offender's record of persistence and the seriousness of his present offense warrant
confinement for a substantially longer term than could be imposed
on him as a juvenile.
The issue of waiver arises primarily in the context of a concern
for public safety. Therefore, legislatures may address the questions
of an offender's record of recidivism or the seriousness of the current offense directly, rather than circuitously, through a judicial inquiry into amenability to treatment or dangerousness. The value
judgment about whether public safety justifies waiver reflects a tension between retribution and utilitarian prevention. While a retributive choice might dictate the automatic exclusion of any juvenile
who committed a serious offense, such as intentional homicide,
rape, armed robbery, or assault with a weapon or with substantial
injury to the victim, a choice based on prevention would exclude a
serious offender only if shown to be a chronic offender.
In addition to defining offense categories or histories, the legislature also needs to prescribe a minimum age of criminal liability for
excluded offenders-sixteen, fifteen, or fourteen. ' 18 At what age is
it appropriate to hold a youth who commits a serious crime as responsible for that offense as an eighteen year old adult? "There is
no compelling or convincing evidence that persons aged sixteen to
eighteen differ significantly from persons aged eighteen and over in
their capacity to understand the outcomes and consequences of
their acts .... Serious crime should be treated seriously regardless
of the offender's age." 1 9
A legislature can adequately consider all of these policy issuesseriousness, persistence, and age of criminal responsibility-when it
defines the outer limits ofjuvenile court jurisdiction and determines
how much serious or repeated juvenile deviance may occur before
an adult sanction is sought. Because legislative selection of exclu118 See, e.g., Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6, at 609-11.
1 19 TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG
OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME

25.
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sion criteria involves both empirical and value choices, the particular combinations of present offense and prior record could vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in light of prevailing crime rates, the
offense characteristics of classes of youthful offenders, the availability of penal bed-space, actual sentencing practices of the adult
courts, and the like. Ultimately, the legislature must work backwards from what the probable adult sentence would be for the particular offense or offender.
Zimring has objected to the adoption of mechanistic legislative
exclusion criteria on the grounds that the legislature will adopt standards drafted on the basis of the hypothetical "worst case scenario"
within various offense categories. The resulting laundry list of excluded offenses and offense histories, Zimring asserts, will quickly
multiply and result in far more transfers than would occur within a
discretionary system. 120 Using Zimring's own rationale for waiver,
however, apart from a very few major offenses against the person,
how many even "worst case" offenses by juveniles without prior
records are likely to result in adult incarceration for a longer duration than available within the juvenile justice system? And if extended incarceration is not likely, then the rationale for exclusion is
obviated.
These issues of public policy and safety should be debated and
decided in the open political arena by democratically elected legislators rather than behind closed doors on an idiosyncratic basis by
individual judges. Offense categories are necessarily crude and imprecise classifications, and many youths charged and tried as adults
will ultimately plead or be found guilty of lesser, nonexcluded offenses. Again, if the rationale of legislative exclusion is that youths
who commit certain "worst case" offenses should be sentenced as
adults, then, regardless of the initial charge, if an individual is subsequently found not to have committed one of the offenses excluded
from juvenile court jurisdiction, he should be returned to juvenile
12 1
court for disposition.
120 Zimring, Notes Toward a Jurisprudenceof Waiver, in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY, Supra
note 7, at 199. Indeed, the experience with California's waiver legislation confirms his

prediction. See Table 1 n.3, which describes an initially short list of offense criteria expanded by subsequent legislatures.

121 If the rationale for transfer, whether judicial or legislative, is based on the seriousness of the offense and the need for extended confinement, then permanent divestiture
of juvenile court jurisdiction should be based on the offense for which a youth is ultimately convicted, not the offense initially charged.
Return to juvenile court is certainly consistent with the statutory policies providing
for differential treatment on the basis of offense committed. Moreover, the policy
reasons that militate against subjecting the prosecutor's charging decision to prior

judicial review do not preclude examining it after the fact. Finally, in the absence of
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DISPOSITIONS OF SERIOUS YOUNG OFFENDERS-TOWARDS AN
INTEGRATED SENTENCING SYSTEM

Ultimately, the question of waiver involves the appropriate dispositions of serious young offenders who happen to be chronological juveniles. The traditional distinction between "treatment" as a
juvenile and "punishment" as an adult is based on an arbitrary legislative line that has no criminological significance other than its legal
consequences. The inconsistencies in sentencing policies between
the juvenile and adult systems often make any attempt to rationalize
social control and the response to serious deviance among the
young futile. These inconsistencies arise from the legislative failure
to recognize that young people are constantly maturing; they are
not irresponsible children one day and responsible adults the next,
except as a matter of law. Moreover, there is a strong correlation
between age and criminal activity, with the rates of many kinds of
criminality peaking in mid- to late-adolescence. 12 2 Chronic offenders are disproportionately involved in criminal activity, committing
their first offenses in their early to mid-teens, persisting in criminal
activity into their twenties, and then gradually reducing their criminal involvement. 12 3 "[T]hose individuals who are arrested as
juveniles are three to four times more likely to be arrested as adults
than are those who are not arrested as juveniles."'' 24 An integrated
and rational sentencing policy requires coordinated responses to juvenile and young adult offenders and should be based on a standardized means of identifying and subsequently sanctioning the
chronic and ultimately serious young criminal.
Despite the criminal career research findings, criminal sentencing policies tend to maximize sanctions for older offenders whose
criminal activity is declining, and often withhold sanctions from
chronic younger offenders at the point at which their rate of activity
is increasing or is at its peak. 125 When juvenile offenders appear in
a transfer-back provision, legislative waiver
prosecutorial abuse via overcharging.
Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6, at 564.
122 Seesupra note 113.

statutes

lend

123 PETERSILIA, supra note 113; CRIMINAL CAREERS, supra note 113,

themselves

to

at 349-50; Green-

wood, supra note 116.
124 Greenwood, supra note 116, at 163.
125 See generally Boland, FightingCrime: The Problen of Adolescents, 71 J.

CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY; 94 (1980); BOLAND & WILSON, Age, Crime and Punishment, 51 PUB. INTEREST 22
(1978); P. GREENWOOD, J. PETERSILIA & F. ZIMRING, AGE, CRIME AND SANCTIONS: THE
TRANSITION FROM JUVENILE TO ADULT COURT (1980) [hereinafter AGE, CRIME AND SANC-

TIONS]; Delinquent Careersand Criminal Policy, supra note 6.
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adult criminal court for the first time as adult offenders, they are
typically accorded the leniency given to adult first offenders.
Greenwood, Abrahamse, and Zimring examined dispositions of
youths tried as adults in several jurisdictions and found substantial
variation in sentencing practices.1 2 6 In New York City and in Franklin County (Columbus), Ohio, it was found that youthful offenders
faced a substantially lower chance of being incarcerated than did
older offenders; that youthful violent offenders got lighter sentences
than older violent offenders; and that, for approximately two years
after becoming adults, youths were the beneficiaries of informal lenient sentencing policies in adult courts. 127 This "punishment gap"
has appeared in other studies as well.' 28 Although the seriousness
of a juvenile's offense is the primary determinant of the severity of
the adult sentence imposed in Washington, D.C., "youth, at least
through the first two years of criminal court jurisdiction, is a percep129
tible mitigating factor."'
In a nationwide study of waived youths sentenced as adults,
Hamparian found that the majority ofjuveniles judicially transferred
were subsequently fined or placed on probation. Even among those
confined, 40%o had maximum sentences of one year or less. In part,
these relatively lenient dispositions reflect the fact that less than
one-third of the youths waived judicially were convicted of offenses
against the person and that the largest proportion were property
offenders, primarily burglars. 130 Similarly, Heuser's evaluation of
the adult sentences received by waived juvenile felony defendants in
Oregon showed that the vast majority were property offenders
rather than violent offenders' 3 ' and that, as a consequence, only
55% of the youths convicted of felonies were incarcerated, with the
rest receiving probation.' 3 2 Moreover, even of those youths incarcerated as adults, nearly two-thirds received jail terms of one year or
less and served an average of about eight months.' 3 3 These disposi126

P.

GREENWOOD, A. ABRAHAMSE

& F.

ZIMRING, FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCE SE-

VERITY FOR YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS 12-14 (1984) [hereinafter FACTORS AFFECTING
SENTENCE SEVERITY]; AGE, CRIME AND SANCTIONS, supra note 125, at 22, 32.
127 See supra note 126.
128 See supra notes 120, 124-25.
129 TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG
OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 63.
130 YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 7, at 106-09.
131 J. P. HEUSER, supra note 89, at 21-22 (16.7% involved violent crime charges

and
83.3% involved property crime charges).
132 Id. at 23. Even this rate is inflated by the fact that youths convicted of violent
offenses Were almost invariably incarcerated. "The incarceration rate is much higher for
violent crimes (75.0%) and much lower for property crimes (51.5%)." Id.
133 Id. at 26-27.
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tions were approximately the same ones that juveniles with extensive prior records who are convicted of felonies within juvenile court
would receive.
Gillespie and Norman's study of youths waived in Utah between
1967 and 1980 revealed that the majority of juveniles who were
transferred were not charged with violent offenses, and the majority
ofjuveniles convicted as adults were not imprisoned. 13 4 In her evaluation of waiver practices, Bortner reported that less than one-third
of the transferred juveniles convicted in adult proceedings were sentenced to prison. She concluded that
a significant number of juveniles remanded to adult courts are returned to the community immediately or shortly after conviction. The
[possible reasons] include their first time offender status in the adult
system, the relatively minor nature of their offenses, and the brevity of
their offense histories compared to adult offenders. .

.

. [R]emanded

juveniles are not being incarcerated uniformly nor for long periods of
time. 135
In analyzing the relationships between the offense for which jurisdiction was waived and the eventual disposition, Hamparian concluded that "[t]here seems to be a direct correlation between low
percentage of personal offenses waived and high proportion of community dispositions (as opposed to incarceration)."'' 3 6 Moreover,
even within the more serious categories of crimes, there are agerelated patterns of seriousness that also affect eventual sentences;
younger offenders are less likely than adults to be armed with guns,
inflict as much injury, or steal as much property. 137 In short, the
differences in sentencing philosophies between the juvenile and
adult justice systems continue to work at cross-purposes even when
youths make the transition from the one system to the other.
The punishment gap, which represents the system's failure to
intervene most strongly in the lives of chronic and active criminal
offenders, occurs both because of qualitative differences in the nature ofjuveniles' offenses and because of the failure to integrate juvenile and adult criminal records for sentencing purposes. Adult
criminal courts tend to rely on the seriousness of the present offense
and the prior adult criminal history in making sentencing decisions.
Their failure to include the juvenile component of the offender's
134 Gillespie & Norman, Does Certification Mean Prison: Some Preliminary Findingsfiom
Utah, 35Juv. & FAM. CT.J. 23 (1984).
135 Bortner, supra note 99, at 56-57 (emphasis added).
136 YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 7, at 112.
137 See AGE, CRIME AND SANCTIONS, supra note 125; M. J. McDERMOTt AND M. J.
HINDELANG, JUVENILE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES: ITS TRENDS AND PAT-

TERNS (1981).
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criminal history stems from the confidential nature ofjuvenile court
records, the functional and physical separation of the respective
court services staffs, and the sheer bureaucratic ineptitude that
makes the maintenance of an integrated system for tracking offenders and compiling complete criminal histories extremely difficult. 13 8
In a recent study of the effects ofjuvenile offense histories on adult
sentencing practices, Greenwood reported that "local sentencing
policies have much more of an impact on how young adults are
treated, than any modest variations in the availability of juvenile
13 9
records."
Legislative definition of the criteria for exclusion of offenders
from juvenile court can better integrate the juvenile and adult
records for sentencing purposes and reduce the gap in intervention.
There is a certain anomaly when youths, waived from juvenile court
because they presumably require longer sentences than the juvenile
system can provide, are placed on probation as adults. With waiver
decisions keyed to offense seriousness and criminal history, rather
than to amorphous clinical considerations, an adult sentencing
court would be in a better position to respond to chronic juvenile
violators. Focusing on cumulative criminal activity, whether as a juvenile or an adult, may maximize social control of the chronic
offender.
IV.

RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN WAIVER STATUTES

The foregoing analysis has identified two primary and interrelated problems posed by judicial waiver practices: the highly discretionary, idiosyncratic nature of this individualized sentencing
decision and the lack of integration between the criteria for removal
of offenders from juvenile court and the sentencing practices in
adult criminal courts. The source of both problems is individualized
judicial sentencing discretion. A juvenile court judge who attempts
to make a clinical determination of a youth's amenability to treatment or dangerousness must do so even though there is little evidence to indicate that there are forms of treatment to which some
serious offenders consistently respond or validated indicators that
permit accurate individualized classification of those who may be responsive to intervention. Because waiver decisions are so indeterminate, juvenile courts exercise extraordinarily broad discretion
138 See AGE, CRIME AND SANCTIONS, supra note 125; Greenwood, supra note 116; PetersiliaJuvenileRecord Use in Adult Court Proceedings: A Survey of Prosecutors, 72 J. GRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1746 (1981).
139 FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY, supra note 126, at 36.
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that exacerbates the potential for discretionary abuse and discrimination.' 40 To the extent that organizational or political considerations result in youths being waived for less serious offenses, the
inconsistency between juvenile and adult criminal sentencing practices is further aggravated.
In the past fifteen years, there have been extensive legislative
modifications of the various transfer mechanisms. These changes
reflect the sentencing policy tensions between dispositions within
the juvenile court and those within the criminal courts. Table 1
summarizes the legislative changes in judicial waiver statutes. Table
2 summarizes the legislative changes in excluded offense or concurrent jurisdiction waiver statutes. It is necessary to consider both tables together because many states employ more than one type of
transfer procedure to deal with different segments of the juvenile
offender population. The unifying legislative policy theme reflected
in both tables is the elevation of the principle of the offense over
traditional, individualized judicial discretion.
A.

CONTROLLING JUDICIAL DISCRETION THROUGH OFFENSE CRITERIA

Legislatures have acted to alleviate some of the obvious
problems of inconsistency and inequality within the framework of
judicial waiver statutes. One of these responses is the adoption of
offense criteria to structure judicial discretion. As Table 1 reveals,
this is accomplished by legislatively specifying the minimum offenses for which judicial waiver may occur, identifying certain categories of serious present offenses or combinations of present
offenses and prior record for special handling, or prescribing the
dispositional consequences that follow from proof of serious present offenses or prior records.
Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia employ, at least
in part, the judicial waiver mechanism. Since 1970, twenty-six have
amended their statutes to add either minimum offense limitations or
present offense/prior offense criteria to structure judicial sentencing discretion. Although many traditional judicial waiver statutes
continue to allow ajudge to waive any offense, regardless of its seriousness, several states have acted to limit waiver to felony offenses.
Six states-Connecticut, Maine, Montana, New Jersey, Vermont,
and West Virginia-have restricted eligibility for waiver to a narrow
range of very serious offenses against the person, such as murder,
140 Zimring, Notes Toward a Jurisprudenceof Waiver, in
note 7, at 199.

READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY, supra

1987]

CHANGES IN JUVENILE WAIVER STATUTES

505

TABLE 1
JUDICIAL WAIVER STATUTES
STATE

JuvCt. Min.Age Waiver
juris. Adult Criteria
Pros.
(Kent)*

Offense
Limits
Minimum

Offense
Prior
Offense

Criteria
Present
Offense

Presume
Mandate
Waiver

Year
Offense
Added**

Alabama
(ALA.CODE §12-15-34)

Felony'

Alaska

Any

1962

Any

[19701

1975

2

(AK.STAT. §47.10.60)

Arizona
(ARIz.REv.STAT.ANN.,

J.C.R. 12,13,14)
Arkansas

[1911]

(ARxSTAT.ANN.

§45-420)
California

18

16
16
16
16

18

14

Felony

16

14

A,B,or
Serious
4
C Felony Juv.

18

16
16

Any

District of Columbia
(D.C.CoDE.ANN.
§ 16-2307(a))

18

15
16

Felony
Prior 6
Commit

Florida

18

14
14

Any

17

15
13
13
13

Any

18

16
16
16

Felony

18

14

Any

[1955]

17

13

Any

[1907]

18

Any

18

14
10
16
16
14

Any

[1967]

18

16

Any

[19651

18

16
None

Felony'

15
15

Any
Rob(arm);
Agg.Burg.
Agg.Kid.

(CAL WELF.&INSr.
CODE §707(a)&(b))

Colorado

Yes

Any

Murder
Rob,Kid
2
Rape

Presume
Presume
Presume

[19151
1976
1977
18
1982
[1903]

(COL.REV.STAT.

§19-1-104)
Connecticut
(CONN.GEN.STAT.

§§46b-126,127)
Delaware
(DEL.CODE.ANN. tit.10

§§938, 921)

(FLA.STAT.ANN.

§39.02)
Georgia
(GA.CODE ANN.

§15-11-39, -39.1)
Hawaii
(HAw.REV.STAT.

§571-22)
Idaho

Cl. A,B,
or C Felo ny

1979

Murder,R
s
ob,
Rape

[1946]
1971
[1938]
1970

Violence
Person

Violence
Person'

[1911]
1975

Burglary

Cap/life
Murder, RaapeH
Kid.,Rob([Arm)
Burglary

[1915]
1973
1980
1982

Cl. A
2 Fel.

Cl. A
Cl. A

[1965]
1981
1981

Mand.9
Mand.

(IDAHO CODE

§16-806)
Illinois
(ILL.ANN.STAT.

ch.37, §702-7)
Indiana
(IND.CoDE ANN.

§31-6-2-4)
Iowa

Murder
CI.A,B
Cl. C

Presum
Presum
Presum

[1945]
1978
1978
1980

(IOWA CODE ANN.

§232.45)
Kansas
(KAN.STAT.ANN.

§38-1636)
Kentucky
(KY.REV.STAT.

ANN.§208.170)
Louisiana
(LA.REV.STAT.ANN.

§1571.1)

17
17

[19081
1974

Class A/
Capital
P/C

1974
1980
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Table 1 JUDICIAL WAIVER STATUTES continued
JuvCt. Min.Age Waiver
Juris. Adult Criteria
(Kent)*
Pros.

STATE

Offense
Prior
Offense

Offense
Limits
Minimum

Criteria
Present
Offense

Presume
Mandate
Waiver

1980

Felony
None

Yes

Murder
CI.A,B,C

15

Yes
Yes

Any

None

17

14
14

Yes
Yes

Commit'
Inflict
BodyHarm

17

15

Yes

Felony

18

14

Maine
(ME .REv.STAT.ANN.
tit.15 §3101)

18

Maryland

18

(MD.CODEANN.

Year
Offense
Added**

Murder
CI.A,B,C

1977
1977

Cap/Life

[1945]
1973

§§3-817)
Massachusetts
(MASS.ANN.LAws Ch.

119,§61)
Michigan

0

1975
1975

Felony

[19461

(MIcII.CoMP.LAws

§712A.4)
Minnesota
(MIINN.STAT.ANN.

16

§260.125)

16
16
16

Mississippi
(MIss.CODE ANN.

[1959]

Any
1
2
2
3

Fel.
Fel.
Burg.
Fel.

Agg.Fel.

Presume

1980

Murderl
Murd.2,3
KidRape
Burglary
Felony

Presume"
Presume
Presume
Presume
Presume

1980
1980
1980
1982
1982

18

13

Yes

Any2

1979

17

14

Yes

Felony'

1983

18

12

Yes
Yes

MurderRape

1985
1974
17

§43-

21-105)
Missouri
(Mo.ANN.STAT.

§211.071)
Montana
(IONT.CODE

ANN.

16

§41-5-206)
Nevada
(NEv.REv.STAT.ANN.
§62.080)

18

16

New Hamp.

18

None

18

14

Yes

Mans.,Agg.

Rob,Rape,Kid
Felony'

[1949]

Felony'

[1937]

(N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.

§ 169-B:24)
New Jersey

Murder,Rob

13

Murder
Rob"13

14

§2A:4A-26)

16

Yes

Murder,Rob Mand.

1982

Rape, Kid.

Rape,Kid

(NJ.STAT.ANN.

Crime

Mand.

1982
[1943]

Felony

New Mexico
(N.M.STAT.ANN.
§32-1-29 §32-1-30)

18

No.Carolina
(N.C.GEN.STAT.
§7A-608)

16

14
14

Felony

No.Dakota
(N.D.CE.NT.CoDE
§27-20-34)

18

14

Any

[1967]

Ohio

18

15

Felony

[1908]

18

None

Felony

[1968]

18

16

Any

[1907]

18

14

1975
1975

Murder
RobRape,
Agg.Burg

15
16

Capital

Mand.

[1919]
1979

(Outo REV.CODEANN.

§2151.26)
Oklahoma

Yes

(OKLA.STAT.ANN.

tit.10 §1112)
Oregon
(OR.REv.STT.

§419.533)
Pennsylvania
(42 PA.CONS.STAT.
ANN. §6355)

Yes

Felony'

1977
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Table 1 JUDICIAL WAIVER STATUTES continued
STATE

Rhode Island

JuvCt. Min.Age Waiver
Juris. Adult Criteria
Pros. (Kent)*
18

16

17

16
14

Offense
Limits
Minimum

Offense
Prior
Offense

Criteria
Present
Offense

Presume
Mandate
Waiver

Felony/Indictable

Year
Offense
Added**
[1944]

(R.I.GEN.LAws

§14-1-7)
So. Carolina
(S.C.CoDE ANN.

2 Agg.Ass.14 Agg.Ass.
Burg;Rob Burg;Rob
Murder,Rape

§20-7-430)
So.Dakota

2

[19361
1981
1981

18

10

Yes

Any

[1968]

18

16
14

Yes
Yes

Any
Murder,Kid
Rape,Rob

[1911]
1970

17

15

Yes

Felony

[1965]

18

14

Yes

Felony

[1931]

16

None
10

Yes
Yes

Murder
is
Murder,Rape
Rob(Arm),Kid

1981
1981

18

15
15
15

(S.D.CoDIFIED LAWS

ANN. §26-11-4)

Tennessee
(TENN.CODE.ANN.

§37-1-134)
Texas
(TEx.FAM.CODEANN.

§54.02)
Utah
(UTAH.CODE ANN.

§78-3a-25)
Vermont
(VT.STAT.ANN. tit.33

§§632, 635)
Virginia
(VA.CODE §16.1-269)

Washington

18

(WAsH.REV.CODE
ANN. §13.40.110)

West Va.

18

Imprisonable
Adult
Felony

Any
16
17
None
None
None
16
16

Vio.Fel.
2 Fel.
Felony

[1950]
1976
1980
[1977]
1977
1977

CI.A Fel.
Rape,Kid.
Rob ,Ass.

(W.VA. CODE

§49-5-10)

Murder,RapeS
Rob(Arm)
Presume
Felony

MurderRape P/C
Rob(Arm),Kid
Violent Fel.
Felony
Violent Fel.

1978
1978
1978
1978

Felony
Wisconsin

18

16

Yes

Any

19

None

Yes

Any

(WIS.STAT.ANN.

[1955]

§48.18
Wyoming
(WYO.STAT.

§ 14-6-237)
Legislation current through June 30, 1986.
SFor the Kent criteria, see supra text accompanying note 83.
S*For jurisdictions without offense criteria, the date indicated in the brackets-[year]-refers to the year
the waiver statute was originally adopted. Dates for later re-enactments are not indicated unless offense
criteria were subsequently added by the legislature.
1. Under previous legislation, any offense was waivable. As amended, onlyfelns offenses are waivable.
2. Under previous legislation, onlyfeloy offenses were waivable. As amended, aig offense is waivable.
3. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §707(b) contains a twenty (20) item catalogue of primarily major offenses
against the person for which adult waiver is presumed. See generally, Feld, Dismantli ,gRehabliaitive Ideal,
supra note 3, at 215-17. §707(b)(I-4, 9-15) was added in 1976; §707(b)(16) in 1977; §707(b)(5-8) in 1979;
and §707(b)(17-20) in 1982.
4. "Serious Juvenile Offenses" as defined in CONN. GEN. STAT. §46b-120 include thirty-nine (39) serious
offenses such as homicide, assault, sexual assault, kidnapping, and certain categories of burglary and
larceny.
5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §921 requires a mandatory waiver hearing for any youth aged 16 or older who is
charged with one of eight (8) offenses which include murder, robbery, burglary, or arson.
6. D.C. CODE ANN. §16-2307(a)(2) authorizes a waiver hearing for a sixteen year old youth charged with
any offense provided the child is "already under commitment to an agency or institution as a delinquent
child......

BARRY C. FELD

[Vol. 78

7. FLA. STAT. ANN. §39.09 defines a violent crime against a person as "Murder, sexual battery, armed or
strong-armed robbery, aggravated battery, or aggravated assault ..
" The offense catalogue was adopted
in 1975 with additions and deletions in 1978. For youths charged with those offenses who have a pnor
conviction of any such offense, a waiver hearing is mandatory. Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 75, at 46 -66.
8. GEORGIA CODE ANN. §15-11-37 catalogues thirteen "designated felonies" which, if committed by a
child thirteen years or older, permit waiver for adult criminal prosecution.
9. HAWAII REv. SrAT. §571-22(c) provides that waiver is mandatory for youths charged with Class A
offenses who have either a previous Class A conviction or 2 prior felony convictions.
10. MAss. ANN. LAWs Ch. 119, §61 authorize waiver of a child who has "previously been committed to the
department of youth services as a delinquent" and whose present offense "would be punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison".
11. Under MINN. STAT. §260.125(3), proof of various combinations of present offense and prior record
creates a "prima facie" case, or presumption in favor of waiver. SeeFeld, Disinantling Rehabilitative Ideal,
supra text footnote 3, at 207. An analysis of the Minnesota legislation, see infra text notes 146-48 and
accompanying text.
12. MONT. CODE ANN. §41-5-206 lists nine (9) offenses or attempts to commit those offenses in its waiver
provision, including murder, rape, arson, aggravated assault, robbery, and kidnapping.
13. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:4A-26 provides for mandatory waiver if there is probable cause to believe that a
juvenile committed a homicide or one of six (6) other offenses. In addition, any offense committed after a
prior conviction of one of those offenses mandates waiver. Other violent offenses against the person and
weapons offenses also mandate waiver.
14. S.C. CODE ANN. §20-7-430(5) provides that any child aged 14 or 15 with two prior and unrelated
adjudications for any of nine (9) offenses against the person charged with a third such offense may be
waived. Regardless of prior convictions, any youth charged with murder or criminal sexual assault may be
waived.
15. VT. STAT. ANN. Ch.12 T.33 § §632, 635a allows discretionary waiver for a child of any age charged with
murder, and any child aged ten (10) to fourteen (14) charged with eleven (11) specified violent felonies.
16. VA. CODE §16.1-269 provides for presumptive waiver of youths charged with armed robbery, rape, or
murder. In addition, for any offense punishable by death, a life sentence, or a term of twenty years or
more, if the juvenile court judge declines to transfer, the prosecutor may have the case reviewed on the
record by a circuit court which may then order the case to remain in juvenile court or allow the prosecutor
to seek a criminal indictment which terminates the juvenile court's jurisdiction.

criminal sexual conduct, armed robbery, and kidnapping. By narrowing the range of waivable offenses to the most serious violent
crimes, such legislation restricts judicial discretion and increases the
likelihood of significant adult dispositions for youths waived under
these criteria.
Within the past decade, about twenty states have legislatively
identified certain serious present offenses and/or prior records for
special waiver consideration. Some specify the procedural consequences of alleging certain offenses. One approach, used in Delaware, is to require a mandatory waiver hearing whenever a juvenile
is charged with one of the enumerated offenses against the person.
Florida requires a waiver hearing for any youth charged with a violent offense who has a prior conviction of an offense against the person. Another procedural consequence, used in North Carolina, is to
require the transfer to criminal court of any youth whom there is
probable cause to believe committed a capital offense. Upon a
showing of probable cause of various combinations of present offense and/or prior record, waiver is presumptive in California, Indiana, and Minnesota and mandatory in Hawaii and New Jersey.
In addition to minimum offense limitations, a second legislative
strategy is to identify certain categories of present offenses for special waiver consequences. California legislative amendments place
the burden of proving fitness for juvenile court treatment on the
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youth if certain enumerated offenses are alleged, rather than requiring the state to prove the youth's nonamenability or dangerousness.
Thus, allegations of certain serious offenses create a presumption in
favor of waiver, and the youth bears the burden of non-persuasion. 14 1 Subsequent amendments in 1977, 1979, and 1982 have expanded the catalogue of offenses which create this presumption of
adulthood.
Evaluations of the impact of the California legislation indicate
that, simply as a result of specifying offense criteria and shifting the
burden of proof, there was a dramatic increase in the number of
youths who were tried as adults after having been charged with one
of the enumerated offenses.14 2 After accounting for possible fluctuations in juvenile crime rates, evaluators reported that "Los Angeles
County experienced a 318% increase in certification hearings and a
234% increase in certifications" between 1976 and 1977.14 3 Moreover, this research indicated that the juveniles who were waived to
stand trial as adults were almost as likely to be convicted as youths
tried in juvenile court and that, following their convictions, they
were more likely to be incarcerated than were theirjuvenile counterparts. 144 Similarly, although Greenwood, Petersilia, and Zimring reported substantial variation in sentencing practices in several
jurisdictions, they found that juveniles tried as adults in Los Angeles
were not sentenced more leniently than other offenders, that for
more serious crimes the seriousness or violence of the crime, not
the age or record of the offender, determined the sentence; and that
in sentencing marginal crimes like burglary the priorjuvenile record
145
appeared to influence the severity of the first adult sentence.
Thus, legislative specification of offense criteria may constrain judicial waiver/sentencing discretion and may increase the likelihood of
significant adult dispositions for such offenders.
In addition to California, at least nine other states-Delaware,
Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, Virginia, and Washington-identify in legislation a serious present offense for special waiver consideration. In most of these
jurisdictions, the present serious offenses are identified as calling
for either capital punishment or life imprisonment, or they are the
most serious offenses in the criminal codes, such as murder, armed
Dismantling the "RehabilitativeIdeal", supra note 3, at 215-17.
K. TEILMANN & M. KLEIN, SUMMARY OF INTERIM FINDINGS OF THE ASSESSMENT
THE IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA'S 1977 JUVENILE JUSTICE LEGISLATION 30-35.
143 Id. at 30.
144 Id. at 32-35.
145 AGE, CRIME AND SANCTIONS, supra note 125, at 22, 32.
141

142
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robbery, criminal sexual conduct, and kidnapping. This legislative
attention to the most serious present offenses reflects the values of
retributivism, a belief that certain heinous offenses deserve adult
consequences.
Even more elaborate legislative offense strategies are found in
nine other states: Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.
These states identify prior offenses in combination with a serious
present offense as grounds for waiver. The emphases on prior
records and present offenses reflect legislative efforts to identify for
selective incapacitation those youths with records of chronic persistence as well as present seriousness.
Minnesota legislation provides that if the prosecution charges
certain types of present offenses or various combinations of present
offenses and prior records, a prima facie case, for waiver is established.' 4 6 Effectively, the statutory offense criteria represent a legislative effort to guide the waiver decision by defining serious juvenile
offenders on the basis of age, present offenses, and prior records.
Moreover, the combinations of present offense and prior record
which create a presumption for waiver vary; as the seriousness of the
present offense decreases, the length of the prior record increases.
Although first degree murder is presumptively an adult offense, routine felonies require three prior felony adjudications. 14 7 Despite
these changes, however, a study of the waiver process in Minnesota
found that less than half of the youths for whom waiver was initially
sought by prosecutors and only about one-third of the youths ultimately referred for adult prosecution met the prima facie criteria.
Furthermore, if compared with waiver practices prior to the amendments, the adoption of the offense criteria appears to have had a
limited impact on the numbers or kinds of youths criminally prose48
cuted in Minnesota.1

In Connecticut, only youths who have prior convictions of "serious juvenile offenses," which are primarily offenses against the
person, and who are charged with a serious present felony may be
waived. The Florida legislation focuses on youths with repeated violent offenses against the person. The Hawaii legislation identifies
for waiver youths charged with Class A felonies who have either a
prior Class A conviction or two prior felony convictions. The South
Carolina legislation also identifies for waiver youths charged with
146 Dismantling the RehabilitativeIdeal, supra note 3.
147 Id. at 194-96.
148 Osbun & Rode, ProsecutingJuvenilesas Adults: The Quest for

CRIMINOLOGY 187 (1984).

"Objective" Decisions, 22
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serious offenses who have two prior convictions for similarly serious
offenses. By emphasizing serious present offenses in combination
with significant prior records, these states both constrain judicial
discretion and increase the probabilities of significant adult dispositions following waiver.
B.

REDUCING THE "PUNISHMENT GAP" BY INTEGRATING JUVENILE
WAIVER CRITERIA WITH ADULT SENTENCING PRACTICES

The legislative changes summarized in Table 1 include efforts
to prescribe more specific present offense criteria, various combinations of present offenses and prior records, and the
waiver/procedural consequences of alleging such offenses in an effort to control judicial sentencing discretion. More fundamental
changes, however, have occurred in states that have rejected the
traditional offender-oriented juvenile court sentencing philosophy
and have emphasized the offense-oriented adult sentencing policies
of retribution, deterrence, and selective incapacitation. States have
accomplished this goal by legislatively narrowing the scope ofjuvenile court jurisdiction to exclude youths charged with certain serious offenses.
In many states, the excluded offenses summarized in Table 2
have been supplemented by judicial waiver statutes that also allow
for the discretionary transfer of juveniles charged with other nonexcluded offenses. Some states exclude only youths charged with
offenses punishable by capital punishment or life imprisonment. In
addition to excluding youths charged with murder, some jurisdictions also exclude youths charged with other serious offenses, such
as criminal sexual conduct, armed robbery, and kidnapping. Still
other jurisdictions exclude youths charged with repeat offenses.
Table 2 summarizes the legislation of the twenty-four states
that use either legislatively excluded offenses and/or concurrent juvenile/criminal court jurisdiction over certain offenses as vehicles to
make the adulthood determination. In three states, Arkansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming, juvenile and criminal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over all offenses, and the prosecutor's charging decision
determines the forum in which the case is heard. Because jurisdiction is determined by the prosecutor's filing of criminal charges
rather than by a judicial waiver/sentencing hearing, these concurrent jurisdiction statutes are tabulated with excluded offense legislation. The Nebraska and Wyoming statutes, however, include Kent
criteria, which purport to guide the prosecutor's discretion. 149
149 For discussion of Kent criteria, see supra notes 75-83 an accompanying text.
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TABLE 2
LEGISLATIVELY EXCLUDED OFFENSES*
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION**
STATE

Minimum Concur
Excluded Offenses
Age
Juris Cap/Life
Offense
Prior
Year
Catalogue
Conviction Adopted***

Arkansas

15

Yes
Yes

--------Any
--------- Murder 1,2
Rape

14

Yes

--------- Cl. I

(ARK.STAT.ANN.

§41-617)
Colorado

1975
1981

(COL.REv.STAT.

§19-1-104(B))
16

Yes'

Cl. 11,111

Felony

§46b- 127)

14
14
14

Murder
Class A
Class B

Class A
2 A or B

Delaware

None

Murder 1,
Rape, Kidnap

Connecticut
(CONN.GEN.STAT.

(DEL.CODE.ANN.

tit.10 §921)
District of Columbia

Murder, Rape,
Burglary(1),
Rob(Armed)

(D.C.CODEANN.

§16-2301(3)
Florida
(FLA.STAT.ANN.

None
16

Yes ---Indict
Yes --------- Any (Inform)

None

Yes-----Yes

1970
Felony2

§§39.02, 39.04)
Georgia

[19511
1978
[1915]

(GA.CODE.ANN.

§15-11-5)
Idaho
(ID.CODE §16-1806A)

Murder, Rob
Rape, Mayhem

1981
1984

Illinois

Murder, Agg.
Crim.Sex,
Rob(Armed)

1982
1983

§31-6-2-1 (d))

Murder2
Rob(Armed),
Kidnap,Rape

1975
1981

Kansas

I Felony

(ILL.ANN.STAT.

ch.37, §702-7)
Indiana
(IND.CODEANN.

(KAN.STAT.ANN.

§38-1602(b)(3))
Louisiana 5

Murder 1,2
Mans.,Agg.Rape
Rob(Armed),Agg.
Burg.,Agg.Kid.

(LA.REV.STAT.ANN.

§ 1570(A)(5))
Maryland
(MD.CODEANN. §3-

Rob(Armed)

804(d))
Mississippi
(MIss.CODE ANN.

2 Felony
Agjuv.
De inquent4

[19451
1973
[1946]

§43-

21-105)
Nebraska

None

Yes

--------Any

(NEB.REV.STAT. §43-

247)
Nevada
(NEv.REV.STAT.

§62.040)

None

Murder or
Att. Murd.

[1974]
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Table 2 LEGISLATIVELY EXCLUDED OFFENSES:
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION continued
STATE

New York
(N.Y.PENALLAWs
§30.00(2))

Minimum Concur
Excluded Offenses
Age
Juris Cap/Life
Offense
Prior
Year
Catalogue
Conviction Adopted***
13
14

13
Ohio
15
(OH.REv.CODEFANN.
§2151.26)
Oklahoma
16
(OK.STAT.ANN. tit.10
§ 1104.2)
Pennsylvania
None
(42 PA.CONS.STAT.
ANN. §6302)
Rhode Island
16
(R.I.GEN.LAws §14-17.1)
Utah
16
(UTAHCODEANN.
§788-3a-25(6))
Vermont
14
(VT.STAT.ANN. tit. 33
§§632,635(a))
Wyoming

13

Int.Murder
Kid,Arson,Rape,
Burg,Att.Murder
Felony Murder
Murder,Agg. Murder,Agg.
Fel. 1, 2,
Fel. 1 2
Fel. 1, 2
Fel. 1, 2
Murder,Kid,Rob,
Rape,ArsonG
Murder

Any Felony

Yes

Yes ---------------

Any

1979
1981
1983
1978

[1933]

2 Felonies

--------- Murder,Agg.
Rob,Rape,Kid 9
Murder,Mans.
Rob(Arm),Rape

1978
1978

1972

1981

°

1981

1971

(WY.STAT. § 14-6-

203(c))
Legislation current through June 30, 1986.
*Does not include minor offenses such as traffic offenses, fish and game violations, or the like
which also may be excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction.
**Concurrent jurisdiction statutes grant prosecutors nonreviewable discretion to file charges
against chronological minors in either juvenile or adult courts. The jurisdictions ofjuvenile
and criminal courts overlap on certain categories of offenses, and the charging decision
determines the forum in which the case is heard. See supra text footnote 75. Where
concurrent jurisdiction is restricted only to certain offenses, those offenses limitations are
indicated in the Excluded Offenses (Offense Catalogue) portion of Table 2.
***The date in the brackets-[year]-refers to the year the concurrent jurisdiction or offense
exclusion statute was originally adopted in its present form. Dates for later re-enactments are
not indicated unless offenses were subsequently excluded by the legislature. Unbracketted
dates refer to recent legislation adding or expanding offense criteria exclusions.
I. Colorado's originally excluded capital offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction in 1923. It
adopted the current criteria which expanded the scope of exclusion in 1973.
2. FLORIDA STAT.ANN. §39.04(2)(e)(4) allows the prosecutor to file an information against
any youth 16 or older that the prosecutor determines requires an adult sanction. However, if
the youth is charged with a misdemeanor, upon motion of the child, the case will be returned
to the juvenile court unless the child has two prior delinquency determinations, at least one of
which involved a felony offense. Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 75, at 463-64.
3. Indiana legislation excluded capital offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction in 1945. In
1975, the capital offense legislation was amended to exclude murder, and additional offenses
were excluded in 1981.
4. KAN.STAT.ANN. §21-3611 defines an aggravated juvenile delinquent as any child 16 or
older, confined in a correctional facility, who burns facilities, assaults guards, or absconds
repeatedly. Kan.Stat.Ann. §38-1602(b)(6) defines any person previously convicted of an
aggravated juvenile delinquency as an adult.
5. Louisiana exlcuded capital offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction in 1950. In 1975,
armed robbery was also excluded. The 1980 legislation reported in Table 2 excludes several
degrees of homicides as well as aggravated rape, robbery, kidnapping and burglary.
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6. Nebraska is a "pure" prosecutorial waiver jurisdiction. NEB.REv.STAT. §§43-247, -276
grants juvenile courts and district courts concurrent jurisdiction over juveniles of any age
charged with felonies, and those 16 or older charged with misdemeanors. The prosecutor's
choice of a juvenile or adult forum is nominally guided by Kent waiver criteria.
7. Omo REV. CODE ANN. §2151.26 excludes from juvenile court jurisdiction any youth who
was previously wavied for adult prosecution, tried and convicted of murder or aggravated
murder or an aggravated felony of the first or second degree or a felony of the first or second
degree, who is charged with any of those offense on a subsequent occasion.
8. OKLA.STAT.ANN. Code tit. 10 §1104.2(A) legislatively excludes ten (10) offenses against
the person from juvenile court jurisdiction, including murder, rape, kidnapping, armed
robbery, and arson.
9. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-25(6) gives concurrent jurisdiction to juvenile and criminal
courts over youths aged 16 or older who are charged with any degree of murder or attempted
murder, and six (6) other major offenses against the person, including aggravated robbery,
burglary, arson, kidnapping, or rape. Indicting or criminally charging a youth with one of
those offenses divests the juvenile court or jurisdiction.
10. VT.STAT.ANN. tit. 33 §§632, 635a excludes eleven (11) major person offenses from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court including murder, kidnapping, robber causing injury, rape
or burglary, but permits the criminal court to "transfer back" the defendant forjuvenile court
proceedings. Under its original juvenile code, Vermont had excluded capital offenses from
juvenile court jurisdiction since 1912.

Moreover, unlike judicial waiver/sentencing discretion, which is
subject to appellate review, the prosecutor's charging decision is not
subject to any type of judicial review.' 50 Every objection to the discretionary and discriminatory aspects ofjudicial waiver is also applicable to these prosecutorial waiver statutes.
The other concurrent jurisdiction states, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, and Utah, restrict their jurisdictional overlap to those offenses calling for capital punishment or life imprisonment or to the
most serious offenses, such as murder, aggravated robbery, criminal
sexual conduct, and kidnapping. Because prosecutors are more
likely than juvenile court judges to be responsive to political pressures and the visibility of serious offenses, more likely to emphasize
retributive considerations over rehabilitative ones, and, as adversaries, less likely to consider the welfare of the accused, their charging
decisions will more frequently emphasize considerations of the offense, such as probable cause and provable legal guilt, than considerations of the offender.' 5 ' Thus, to the extent that these
concurrent jurisdiction statutes are confined to the most serious offenses carrying a high probability of adult incarceration, they also
serve to integrate juvenile and criminal sentencing practices.
The principal conceptual alternative to judicial waiver is legislation which simply excludes certain categories of serious offenses
and/or prior records from juvenile court jurisdiction. If charged
with one of these offenses, youths above a statutory minimum age
are tried as adults. While such statutes are sometimes characterized
150 See, e.g., Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6, at 558-61; Thomas & Bilchik,
supra note 75, at 478.
151 Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6, at 564; THOMAS & BILCHIK, supra note 75.
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as prosecutorial waivers because the decision as to the offense
charged determines the forum, it is the legislature, not the prosecutor, which makes the policy choice. By legislatively focusing on
characteristics of the offense rather than the offender, such legislation precludes any consideration of an individual's characteristics.
Of the eighteen states with excluded offense legislation, fourteen exclude, at least in part, on the basis of a serious present offense alone. These offenses either result in capital punishment or
life imprisonment-Maryland and Mississippi-or are the most serious felony offenses in the criminal code (murder, criminal sexual
conduct, armed robbery, and kidnapping)-Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada,
New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.
In the home of the original Cook County Juvenile Court, for
example, the Illinois legislature redefined the jurisdiction of tl~ejuvenile court in 1982 to exclude entirely from its jurisdiction any
youth aged fifteen or older who was charged with murder, armed
robbery, or rape. 15 2 Such youths, regardless of their age, appear
automatically in the adult courts for criminal prosecution. In the
seven years prior to the offense exclusion legislation, Cook County
averaged approximately forty-seven judicially-waived youths per
year. In the first two years following the enactment of the offense
exclusion legislation, the rates of adult criminal prosecution of
juveniles more than tripled to 170, 151 of which resulted from the
53
automatic transfer provision.'
Similar catalogues of very serious present offenses against the
person are found in many other jurisdictions as well. New York,
which had no judicial waiver provisions and where juvenile court
jurisdiction ends at age sixteen, adopted juvenile offender legislation in 1978 which excludes thirteen-year-olds charged with murder, and fourteen-year-olds charged with kidnapping, arson, rape,
and the like.' 54 By increasing the certainty of adult prosecution, the
rationale of the legislation was crime deterrence. 155 Evaluations of
the impact of the legislation, however, did not find any systematic
decline in juvenile arrests for the excluded offenses. "An organiza152 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-7 (Smith-Hurd 1982).
153 CHICAGO LA" ENFORCEMENT STUDY GROUP, JUVENILES TRIED AS ADULTS: COOK

COUNTY 1975-1984 (1986).
154 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1978).
155 Hariston, Black Crime and the New York StateJuvenile Offender Law: A Consideration of
the Effects of Lowering the Age of CriminalResponsibility, in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY, supra

note 6, at 295; S.Singer & D. McDowall, Organizing for Deterrence andJuvenileJustice:
The Impact of New York'sJuvenile Offender Law on Rates ofJuvenile Crime (1986)(paper presented at the American Society of Criminology).

516

BARRY C. FELD

[Vol. 78

tional change and an increase in the severity of punishment does not
' 56
necessarily lead to reductions in violent juvenile crime."'
In a similar attempt to measure deterrent effects, Ruhland,
Gold, and Hekman compared rates of offending between juveniles
and young adults in states with different maximum age jurisdictions. 157 Although they reported lower official and self-reported
rates of offending for youths in states in which seventeen-year-olds
are "adults" rather than juveniles, it is also suggested that police
may be more reluctant to treat younger "adults" as formally as
somewhat older youths.
[T]he data may reflect the practice of the justice system of taking age
into account in determining whether offenders will be formally
processed and, more specifically become recorded arrests. The system
appears less strict with 16- and 17-year-old adults, especially the former... [T]his greater leniency may be known to 16-year-olds, so adult
16s are not deterred from committing even felonies by the spectre of
criminal prosecution and
are as delinquent as their juvenile counter58
parts in other states.1
In part, then, the impact of offense exclusion legislation may be vitiated by informal system responses, and "attempts to use the greater
severity of punishment inherent in adult status to deter juvenile
crime could backfire if the minimum age for adult status is set too
low. "159

Another five states emphasize a juvenile's prior record in addition to the present offense in defining juvenile court jurisdiction.
Typically, these statutes balance the seriousness of the present offense with the length of the prior record. Thus, Connecticut excludes youths charged with a Class A felony who have a prior Class
A felony conviction. For youths charged with Class B offenses, however, two prior convictions of Class A or B offenses are required.
Kansas and Rhode Island exclude youths charged with any felony
156 S. Singer & D. McDowall, supra note 155, at 20. But see, Glassner, Ksander & Berg,
A Note on the Deterrent Effect ofJuvenile vs. Adult Jurisdiction, 31 Soc. PROBS. 219 (1983), in

which it is noted that, for many youths who appear to reduce or cease their delinquent
involvements in mid-adolescence, "this change is a conscious decision based on their
perceptions of differences in the criminal justice system's treatment ofjuvenile and adult
criminals." The authors conclude that:
most of the adolescents studied reported that they curtail involvements in criminal
activities at age 16, because they feared beingjailed if apprehended as adults. They
treat the period prior to age 16 as one for experimenting with criminal behaviors,
while viewing late adolescence as a time for giving up such involvement unless one
is ready to make a longterm commitment and face substantial risks in so doing.
Id. at 221.
157 Ruhland, Gold & Hekman, DeterringJuvenileOrize: Age ofJurisdiction, 13 YOUTH AND

Soc'y 353 (1982).
158 Id. at 373.
159 Id. at 374.
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who have two prior felony convictions. By legislatively emphasizing
an offender's cumulative persistence, rather than just the current seriousness, these statutes reflect a balance between retributive and
60
selective incapacitative policies.'
The dates when these offense exclusion statutes were adopted
are especially significant. Although the capital/life sentence exclusions have been in the statutes for more than forty years in states
such as Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, and
Vermont, thirteen of the present offense exclusion states have
adopted or have expanded this strategy within the past fifteen years.
Beginning in 1970, and in direct response to the Supreme Court's
Kent decision, Congress excluded a catalogue of offenses from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts of the District of Columbia.' 6 1 By
1975, four other states followed suit, and, by 1980, nine states excluded serious present offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction.
The remaining states have acted similarly since 1980. Thus, there is
a very strong trend to legislatively excise the most serious young
offenders from juvenile court jurisdiction solely on the basis of their
offense.
Regardless of the statutory details, the thrust of these laws is to
remove sentencing discretion from judges with respect to the juvenile or adult disposition and to base the sentencing decision explicitly on some aspects of the offenses charged. Whether the
dispositional determination is made directly by the legislature via
offense exclusion or on a discretionary basis by the prosecutor via
concurrent jurisdiction, the net effect is a reduction in both judicial
discretion and the juvenile court's clientele.
In addition to reducing judicial sentencing discretion, legislation which targets the most serious offenses or which couples serious present offenses with prior records also increases the likelihood
of significant adult sentences for serious young offenders.
Hamparian's survey of waived youths showed that the largest group
was property offenders and that the majority of all waived offenders
received non-incarcerative dispositions. 6 2 This "punishment gap"
16 3
has been reported in other studies as well.
It is instructive to compare the sentencing ofjuveniles tried as
160 Delinquent Careersand CriminalPolicy, supra note 6; Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra
note 6.
161 See Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6, at 558-66.
162 YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 7, at 106.
163 AGE, CRIME AND SANCTIONS, supra note 125; Bortner, supra note 99; TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME.
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adults in jurisdictions in which they are targeted as serious offenders
with the sentences received in more discretionary jurisdictions. In
their study of waived youths' dispositions in Florida, a concurrent
jurisdiction/direct file state, Thomas and Bilchik reported that the
majority of youths tried as adults were older males with prior delinquency adjudications and multiple present felony charges, typically
property offenses. 164 Unlike Hamparian's findings, however, approximately two-thirds of these Florida juveniles were sentenced to
substantial terms of imprisonment. 6 5
Rudman, Hartstone, Fagan, and Moore studied the processing
and dispositions of "violent juvenile offenders," who are youths
with a present violent offense and a prior felony adjudication, tried
1 66
and sentenced as juveniles or as adults in several jurisdictions.
Of the youths targeted as violent and convicted in criminal courts,
over ninety percent were incarcerated, and their sentences were five
times longer than those youths retained in juvenile court. They
concluded that "because the criminal justice system is not limited by
the jurisdictional age considerations of the juvenile justice system,
violent youths convicted and sentenced in criminal court receive
considerably longer sentences, in adult secure facilities, than their
16 7
counterparts retained by the juvenile court."'
In his study of transferred juvenile felony defendants in Oregon, Heuser reported that seventy-five percent of the youths convicted of violent offenses were incarcerated and that youths
committed to prison received average sentences in excess of six
years.' 68 Greenwood, Abrahamse, and Zimring compared the
sentences of young adult armed robbers and burglars with the
sentences ofjuveniles and older adults to determine the prevalence
of a "leniency gap."' 69 Although not directly comparable to the
studies of dispositions of waived juveniles, they reported that young
adult armed robbers were sentenced as severely as younger and
older offenders on the basis of the seriousness of their present offense. The effects of prior juvenile records on young adult dispositions, however, were found to be inconsistent across jurisdictions.
In sum, these studies suggest that when waiver is confined to a nar164 Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 75, at 470-74.
165 Compare id. at 474 with YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN TWO WORLDS, supra note

7, at 112.
166 Rudman, Hartstone, Fagan & Moore, Violent Youth in Adult Court: Processand Punishment, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 5 (1986) [hereinafter Violent Youth in Adult Court].
167

Id. at 89.

168 j. P. HEUSER, supra note 89, at 24, 28-29.
169 See, e.g., FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY, supra note 126, at 52; Greenwood, supra note 116.
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row category of violent and/or repetitive offenders, the sentences
that they receive as adults are substantial. It must be emphasized,
however, that violent and repetitive juvenile offenders are a small
subset of the group ofjuveniles typically waived in most discretionary jurisdictions.
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF WAIVER FOR JUVENILES AND JUSTICE

Public and political concern about chronic and serious young
offenders has spawned a variety of "get tough" legislative responses. "Get tough" waiver legislation seldom addresses the consequences for youths of incarceration in adult correctional facilities,
the quality or effectiveness of programs available to them, or the
comparative effects of juvenile versus adult dispositions on recidivism.' 7 0

Such legislation is, however, indicative of the contempo-

rary sentencing policy debate between proponents of individualized,
offender-oriented dispositions and advocates ofjust deserts offensebased dispositional practices.
The juvenile court, as originally conceived, was an exemplar of
offender-oriented individualization at sentencing. Discretionary judicial waiver statutes reflected the same philosophical predeliction.
Within the span of fifteen years, however, an erosion of support for
the "rehabilitative
ideal"' 17 1 has
occurred in juvenile
waiver/sentencing practices as well. Concern about the exercise of
judicial discretion and the integration of sentencing practices between juvenile and criminal courts has animated much of the legislative activity summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
Legislative modifications of judicial waiver statutes (Table 1)
and the exclusion of offenses from juvenile court (Table 2) represent significant challenges to the underlying philosophy of therapeutic individualization. The specification of present offense
and/or prior record criteria reflects legislative disquiet with judicial
sentencing practices. The addition of presumptive or mandatory
waiver requirements for youths meeting offense criteria removes a
significant element of judicial sentencing discretion. These reflect
the same presumptive sentencing practices increasingly prevalent in
the adult criminal justice system as well.
The legislative exclusion of serious present offenses, with or
without prior records, has even more significant implications for the
juvenile court as an institution. Offense exclusion represents a re170 Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 75, at 475-78; Violent Youth in Adult Court, supra note
166, at 93.
171 See F. ALLEN, supra note 22.
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pudiation of the traditional, offender-oriented treatment dispositions characteristic of the juvenile court in favor of mechanistic,
offense-oriented decisions. Exclusion also represents an expression
of legislative distrust of juvenile court judges' discretionary decision-making. If legislators perceived juvenile court judges as properly and consistently responding to serious juvenile offenders, there
would be less legislative impetus to take those decisions out of the
judges' hands. In light of the substantial research from many jurisdictions showing the inherent arbitrariness ofjuvenile court's waiver
decisions in juvenile courts, there is ample support for the legislatures' disquiet.
The simple removal of certain categories of offenses represents
a narrowing of the juvenile courts' jurisdiction and a subsequent
diminution in the number of youths appearing before the court.
Moreover, exclusion on the basis of offenses represents a legislative
repudiation of the courts' philosophical premise that it can aid those
appearing before it by denying the courts the opportunity to try,
without even an inquiry into the characteristics of the offending
youth. Finally, to the extent that the McKeiver Court denied the provision of jury trials in juvenile court to juveniles because juveniles
received sympathetic and compassionate intervention from the
court, the repudiation of individualization in favor of the principle
of offense calls into question the premises upon which many of the
procedural characteristics of the juvenile court are based.
A.

JUVENILES' CRIMINAL RESPOSIBILITY-WAIVER, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, AND CULPABILITY

Waiver of youths from juvenile court to criminal court requires
a reassessment of the criminal responsibility ofjuveniles. While juvenile court jurisdiction over an adjudicated offender may continue
for the duration of minority, this disposition is significantly shorter
than the sentences that may be imposed if a juvenile is tried and
convicted as an adult for a serious felony. Indeed, when waiver legislation explicitly excludes capital offenses or their functional
equivalents, juveniles tried in criminal courts are exposed to the
possibility, indeed the reality, of execution for offenses committed
while they were juveniles. 172 Executing youths convicted of crimes
172 The issue of youthful criminal responsibility is most explicit in the context of capital punishment for juveniles convicted of serious crimes. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma,
616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104 (1982); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 724 P.2d 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987). See generally, F. ZIMRING, CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982); Hill, Can the Death Penalty be Imposed on Juveniles: The Unanswered Question in
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committed while they were juveniles challenges the basic understanding about the criminal responsibility of adolescents. "The
spectacle of our society seeking legal vengeance through execution
of a child raises fundamental questions about the nature of children's moral responsibility for their actions and about society's
73
moral responsibility to protect and nurture children."'
The juvenile court, as originally conceived, was premised on
the immaturity and irresponsibility of children. The deterministic
assumptions of positivism and the view ofjuveniles as lacking criminal capacity resulted from the earlier common law's infancy mens
rea defense.1 74 Since criminal liability is premised on rational actors
who make blameworthy choices and are responsible for the consequences of their acts, the common law recognized and exempted
from punishment categories of persons who lacked the requisite
moral and criminal responsibility. Children less than seven years of
age were conclusively presumed to be without criminal capacity,
while those fourteen years of age and older were treated as fully
responsible. Between the ages of seven and fourteen years, there
was a rebuttable presumption of criminal incapacity. 175 Juvenile
court legislation simply extended upward by a few years the general
presumption of youthful criminal incapacity.
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 13 GRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1984); Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The
American Experience with CapitalPunishmentfor Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36
OKLA. L. REV. 613 (1983); Note, CapitalPunishmentforMinors: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1471 (1983) [hereinafter CapitalPunishment of Minors];

Note, Executing Youthful Offenders: The Unanswered Question in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 13 FORD.
URB. L.J. 471 (1985) [hereinafter note, Executing Youthful Offenders]. Zimring states
succinctly:
[m1]he question of whether a 16-year-old accused of murder will stay in juvenile
court, or be tried in the criminal courts for a capital crime, will depend on an individual judge assessing whether that 16-year-old is "mature" and "sophisticated." If
he is found to be "sophisticated," his reward can be eligibility for the electric chair.
F. ZIMRING, CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE Xii.
173 Streib, supra note 172, at 637.
174 See generally Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659
(1970); McCarthy, The Role of the Concept of Responsibility in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings,
10 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 181 (1977); Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court,
31 UCLA L. REV. 503 (1984); Weissman, Toward an IntegratedTheory of Delinquency Responsibility, 60 DEN. L.J. 485 (1983).
175 See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 351 (1972); Fox, supra note 174;
McCarthy, supra note 174; Westbrook, Mens Rea in theJuvenile Court, 5 J. FAM. L. 121
(1965); Weissman, supra note 174; Walkover, supra note 174, at 512. Walkover notes
that:
At common law the infancy defense was grounded in an unwillingness to punish
individuals incapable of forming criminal intent and thus incapable of assuming responsibility for their acts. Linked to that normative imperative was the common
sense judgment that punishment cannot deter an individual from commission of
future wrongful acts where he is in fact incapable of knowing right from wrong.
Id. (citations -omitted).
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The emergence of the principle of offense in waiver statutes,
coupled with the possibility of capital punishment following conviction as an adult, challenged the juvenile courts' basic assumptions
about young peoples' lack of criminal responsibility. Making
juveniles eligible for capital punishment constitutes a legislative
judgment that young people are just as responsible, culpable, and
blameworthy as their somewhat older counterparts and, therefore,
are just as deserving of punishment. 176 Both historically and presently, children have been executed, 177 and the constitutionality of
executing offenders for crimes committed as juveniles will be reconsidered by the United States Supreme Court during its 1987 term in
78
Thompson v. Oklahoma.I
The extent to which young offenders are as deserving of punishment as their adult counterparts hinges in a fundamental way on
an assessment of culpability and the extent to which youthfulness is,
or should be, a formal mitigating factor which bars execution. The
underlying rationale of "deserved" punishments, or just deserts, derives from von Hirsch's writings in moral philosophy. 179 Central to
the contemporary deserts theory, which is addressed explicitly only
to adult offenders, is the notion of punishment as censure, condemnation, and blame. "[P]unishing someone conveys in dramatic fashion that his conduct was wrong and that he is blameworthy for
having committed it. ' ' 180 Proportioning penalties to the seriousness
of the crime reflects the connection between the nature of the con8
duct and its blameworthiness.1 1
176 See, e.g., E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975), in which the author asserts that:
There is little reason left for not holding juveniles responsible under the same laws
that apply to adults. The victim of a fifteen-year-old mugger is just as much mugged
as the victim of a twenty-year-old mugger, the victim of a fourteen-year-old murderer or rapist is as dead or as raped as the victim of an older one. The need for
social defense or protection is the same.
Id. at 174. See also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
177

See, e.g., Note, Executing Youthful Offenders: The Unanswered Question in Eddings v.

Oklahoma, 13 FORD. URB. LJ. at 472 (287 of the known 14,029 criminals executed in
American history were juveniles under the age of eighteen).
178 724 P.2d 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987). The
constitutionality of executing juveniles is reviewed in several articles. See supra note 172.
See also, Streib, Capital Punishment of Children in Ohio: "They' d Never Send a Boy of Seventeen to
the Chair in Ohio, Would They?", 18 AKRON L. REV. 51 (1984). As of October 2, 1986,

there are thirty-six juveniles currently sentenced to death. See V. Streib, Death Penalty
forJuveniles: Last Gasps of a 344-Year-Old American Practice? (1986)(paper presented
at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Atlanta, Georgia).
179 See, e.g., DOING JUSTICE, supra note 62; PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 62.
180 DOING JUSTICE,

supra note 62, at 48. See also Hart, The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23

LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958).
181 DOING JUSTICE, supra note 62, at

66. "Severity of punishment should be commen-
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Although the principle of commensurate desert apportions the
sanctions, condemnation, and blame to the seriousness of the offense, it shifts the analytical focus to the meaning of "seriousness."
The seriousness of an offense is the product of two components:
harm and culpability. 182 Evaluations of harm focus on the degree of
injury inflicted, risk created, or value taken)18 3 In assessing the
harmfulness of a criminal act, the age of the perpetrator is of little
consequence.
Assessments of seriousness, however, also include the quality of
the actor's choice to engage in the conduct that produced the
harm. 8 4 "The other major component of seriousness is the degree
of the offender's culpability: that is, the degree to which he may
justly be held to blame for the consequences or risks of his act."' 8 5
It is with respect to the culpability of choices, or the blameworthiness of acting in a particular harm-producing way, that the fact of
youthfulness becomes especially troublesome.
Psychological research concerning legal socialization indicates
that young people move through a developmental sequence of
stages of cognitive functioning with respect to legal reasoning, internalization of social and legal expectations, and ethical decisionmaking. 18 6 This developmental sequence and the changes in cognitive processes are strikingly parallel to the imputations of responsibility associated with the common law infancy defense and indicate
that by about age fourteen a youth has acquired most of the legal
and moral values and reasoning capacity that will guide his behavior
surate with the seriousness of the wrong. Only grave wrongs merit severe penalties;
minor misdeeds deserve lenient punishments." Id. Von Hirsch notes further that:
The severity of the penalty carries implications of degree of reprobation. The
sterner the punishment, the greater the implicit blame: sending someone away for
several years connotes that he is more to be condemned than does jailing him for a
few months or putting him on probation. In the allocation of penalties, therefore,
the crime should be sufficiently serious to merit the implicit reprobation.
Id. at 72.
182 Id. at 79.
183 Id. See generally J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 212-22 (2nd ed.
1960).
184 The whole criminal law construct of mens rea-purposely, knowingly, recklessly,
negligently-reflects the view that the same harm may result from very different quality
of choices, which, in turn, are reflected in the overall assessment of seriousness.
185 DOING JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 80.
186 See, e.g., J. PIAGET, THE MORALJUDGEMENT OF THE CHILD (1932); Kohlberg, Stage
and Sequence: The Cognitive DevelopmentalApproach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347 (D. Goslin ed. 1969); Tapp & Kohlberg, Developing
Senses of Law andLegalJustice, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 90 (J. Tapp
& F. Levine eds. 1977); Tapp & Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategiesfor an Ethical Legality,
27 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1974).
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through later life.',8 7
If a youth age fourteen years or older knows "right from
wrong" and, therefore, possesses the requisite mens rea, then both
at common law and under most waiver statutes he is as fully criminally responsible as any adult offender. In the mens rea-as-capacity
formulation, if he is criminally responsible for making blameworthy
choices, then he deserves the same punishment as any other criminal actor making comparable choices. 18 8 Mens rea as a criminal law
grading principle is characteristically binary; it is either present or
absent. 189 In the absence of some "diminished responsibility" doctrine, 90 there are no special doctrinal protections for youths tried in
criminal courts.
The immaturity and irresponsibility doctrines that underlie the
traditional juvenile court have implications for juveniles tried as
adults. Punishing juveniles as if they were as responsible as adult
criminal actors requires a closer examination of culpability and the
impact of youthfulness on blameworthiness. Mens rea as a grading
principle assumes knowledge of "right from wrong," an awareness
of the consequences of acting, and an ability to choose among the
187

See, e.g., Kohlberg, The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order, 6

VrrA HUMANA 11, 16 (1963)(By the age of fourteen, most people employ the same or

nearly the same level of moral reasoning as they will as adults.) Tapp notes that "crystallization occurs during the adolescent years and ... substantial consistency is demonstrated during adulthood." Tapp, Psychology and the Law: An Overture, 27 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOLOGY 359, 374 (1976).
188 See, e.g., J. HALL, supra note 183. Hall notes that 'Capacity'.. . means the competence to form correct valuations, which are assumed to be those represented in the penal
code." Id. at 98. While explicating the "objective" meaning of mens rea as goal directed conduct, id. at 76, Hall notes that assessing culpability requires knowledge not
only of the harm committed but the motive for the harm producing conduct. Although
an actor's motive cannot excuse violations of penal prohibitions, it is clearly relevant to
culpability and sanctions.
[A]lthough motivation is carefully considered in modem criminal law systems, the
preservation of the objective meaning of the principle of mens rea and of legality
requires that motive be excluded from the definition of criminal conduct. A sound
division of relevant functions implements the consequent allocation of the issues
concerning culpability-mens rea to the substantive legal, and motive to the administrative, discretionary phase of the process of adjudication.
Id. at 102.
189 Apart from the infancy defense, the presence or absence of criminal responsibility,
i.e., the knowledge of right from wrong, is typically litigated in the context of an insanity
defense. See generally H. FINGARETrE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY (1972); A.
GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1982); Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 779
(1985).
190 See, e.g., Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two
Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827 (1977); Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1984).
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alternative courses of action.' 9 ' Although developmental psycho-

logical research indicates that adolescents may know right from
wrong as an abstract proposition, whether they are sufficiently aware
of the consequences of their actions and as capable of making mature choices as older offenders is questionable.19 2 Indeed, it is this
"developmental fact" that accounts for many of the legal disabilities
93
imposed on children.'
Even if it is acknowledged that juveniles are capable of inflicting
harms identical to those of older offenders, the question whether
they are as culpable for those harms is more difficult. The developmental psychological research suggests that, even with an awareness
of "right from wrong," minors are less capable than adults of making sound judgments or moral distinctions.' 9 4 In part, this reduced
capacity stems from the lower appreciation by juveniles of the consequences of their acts than by adults.
[A]dolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are
more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self disciplined than adults.
Crimes committed by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those
committed by older persons, but they deserve less punishment because adolescents have less capacity to
control their conduct and to
19 5
think in long range terms than adults.
191 See, e.g., Walkover, supra note 174, at 539, in which the author notes that:
[W]e will punish where the accused has the capacity to understand the substantive
nature of acts we consider right or wrong, to generate an internalized set of moral
values and, in most jurisdictions, to exercise control over impulses that conflict with
such values. The infancy defense rests on the assumption that a child's capacity to
make moral judgments is substantially different from his adult counterpart.
Id. (citations omitted). See also, Morse, supra note 190, at 6.
192 See, e.g., Walkover, supra note 174, at 508 n.13. Walkover asserts that punishing
juveniles equivalently as adults "ignores the fact that children committing crimes have
less of a capacity to be culpable than adults and thus are less blameworthy." Id.
193 The recognition that children stand on a different legal footing from adults is reflected in the host of legal disabilities imposed on children for their own protection. As
one court has noted:
The concept of establishing different standards for a juvenile is an accepted
legal principle since minors generally hold a subordinate and protected status in
our legal system. There are legally and socially recognized differences between the
presumed responsibility of adults and minors.... [M]inors are unable to execute a
binding contract, unable to convey real property, and unable to marry of their own
free will. It would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to hold that one whom the
State deems incapable of being able to marry, purchase alcoholic beverages, or even
donate their own blood, should be compelled to stand on the same footing as an
adult [for purposes of waiving Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights].
Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 437-38, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141-42 (1972)(citations omitted).
194 See supra notes 186-87. See also, G. MANASTER, ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND THE
LIFE TASKS (1977); M. RUTrER, CHANGING YOUTH IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 238 (1980);
Kohlberg, Development of Moral CharacterandMoral Ideology, in REvIEW OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 404-05 (M. Hoffman & L. Hoffman eds. 1964).
195 TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG
OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME,

supra note 87, at 7. One commentator has

526

BARRY C. FELD

[Vol. 78

Moreover, the crimes ofjuveniles are seldom their fault alone; society shares at least some of the blame for their offenses as a result of
juveniles' limited opportunities to learn to make correct choices. 19 6
Indeed, even though the ability to make responsible choices is
learned behavior, the dependent status of juveniles systematically

deprives them of opportunities to learn to be responsible.

97

Fi-

nally, even if a youth is aware of the abstract criminal prohibition,

juveniles are more susceptible to peer group influences and group
process dynamics than are their older counterparts. 198
The question of a youth's criminal capacity and culpability is
most apparent in the context of capital punishment. For chronological juveniles tried and convicted in criminal courts for capital offenses, youth is recognized as a mitigating factor in the death
penalty decision.1 99

In Eddings v. Oklahoma, for example, the

Supreme Court noted that "just as the chronological age of a minor
is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the
background and mental and emotional development of a youthful

defendant be duly considered in sentencing.- 20 0 A small minority
noted that "[t]he responsibility of minors also is diminished because they are in a developmental stage characterized by defiance of authority and conducive to criminal activity." Capital Punishmentfor Minors, supra note 172, at 1494.

196 "[Y]outh crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, which share responsibility for the development of America's youth." TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME

7. See generally CapitalPunishmentfor Minors, supra note 172, at 1495-98.
197 See, e.g., F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982).

198 Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-Known Secret, 72J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867 (1981)(ouveniles' group participation in criminal activity overstates the age contribution to overall crime rates). In Thompson v. Oklahoma, for example,
Thompson, age 15, was the youngest of the four participants in the brutal homicide. See
supra notes 172, 178 and accompanying text for discussions of Thompson v. Oklahoma.
199 See generally Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978)(full consideration of all
mitigating factors). The Lockett Court noted that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer ... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record.., that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604 (emphasis supplied). The Court invalidated the Ohio death penalty statutes because "consideration of defendant's . . . age,
would generally not be permitted, as such, to affect the sentencing decision." Id. at 608.
See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 117 (application of Lockett mitigating factors to
youthfulness).
200 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116. The four Eddings dissenters, however, saw no constitutional bar to the imposition of the death penalty for a crime committed at age sixteen.
Id. at 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)(joined by JJ. White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist).
Moreover, Justice O'Connor noted in her concurrence that "I, however, do not read the
Court's opinion either as altering this Court's opinions establishing the constitutionality
of the death penalty or as deciding the issue of whether the Constitution permits imposition of the death penalty on an individual who committed a murder at age 16." Id. at
119 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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of jurisdictions explicitly prohibit the execution of offenders for
crimes committed while the offenders were juveniles. 20 1 Others
simply weigh youthfulness as a mitigating factor offsetting aggravating factors in the decision to impose the death penalty. 20 2 Although
all capital jurisdictions must formally consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor, the majority of such states still authorize the execution of juveniles.
Even though this Article strongly supports the use of offense
criteria to structure the waiver decision, it does not follow that
youths transferred pursuant to such a scheme are as criminally responsible as their adult counterparts. Quite the contrary, to the extent that traditional waiver legislation focuses primarily on a youth's
amenability to treatment or dangerousness or, more recently, on
patterns of offenses, there is simply no occasion for comparing a
youth's culpability for crimes committed while ajuvenile with that of
20 3
an adult.
If, as contended, juveniles who cause substantial harms may be
less culpable than their adult counterparts, then a necessary corollary of waiver statutes that increase the probability of transfer to
criminal courts ofjuveniles who commit the most serious offenses is
an absolute prohibition against executing offenders for crimes committed while under the age of eighteen. Although this is presently
201 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.6(1)(d) (1980)(if a murder
defendant was under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the crime,
the court shall impose a sentence of a first-degree felony instead of capital punishment).
The Code drafters reasoned that "civilized societies will not tolerate the spectacle of
execution of children." Id. § 133. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (West Supp. 1984);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(2) (1978); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(d) (Vernon
Supp. 1985); Streib, supra note 172, at 635 nn.91-93.
202 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(7) (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(g) (West
1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(E) (Supp. 1983). As one commentator has
noted, however:
These states allow the jury to decide whether the defendant's youth is a sufficiently
significant factor to commute the death penalty to life imprisonment. However,
they do not specify how old the defendant must be for his age to be considered as a
mitigating factor nor do they suggest that a lower age must lead to a greater mitigation; they simply state that the youth of the defendant may be considered in determining the length of his sentence.
Note, Executing Youtlful Offenders, supra note 172, at 496. See also Streib, supra note 172, at
635 nn.94-95.
203 See CapitalPunishmentfor Minors, supra note 172, at 1499:
Nor do the criteria used in making transfer decisions indicate that transferred minors are as accountable for their crimes as adults are for theirs. Under legislative
waiver, minors are transferred solely on the basis of the crime they allegedly committed.... Butjust because a minor commits murder or rape or any other violent
offenses does not indicate that society is less responsible for the minor's act. Nor is
it evidence that the minor is more mature than his peers or is able to control his
conduct and understand the consequences of his actions.
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the law in a limited number of capital states, the Supreme Court has
not ruled that the Constitution prohibits the execution ofjuveniles.
Furthermore, there is at least an intimation that Thompson v.
Oklahoma will provide the Court with an opportunity to endorse the
practice. 20 4 If the Supreme Court does constitutionally endorse this
practice, it will put the United States in conflict with the sound pol20 6
icy judgment of a number of its states, 20 5 most foreign countries,
20 7
and the United States' own international treaty obligations.
B.

THE QUALITY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE-THE CONSEQUENCES OF
"MAKING OFFENSES COUNT" IN JUVENILE COURT

One consequence of the legislative changes in waiver statutes
described earlier is the increased significance of a juvenile's prior
record of delinquency adjudications in addition to the seriousness
of the present offense. Whether a record of prior convictions presumptively requires judicial waiver or results in a youth's automatic
exclusion from juvenile court, the effect of "making offenses count"
is to increase the significance of every prior contact with the juvenile
justice system. Although emphasizing prior offenses may help to
structure discretionary decision-making throughout thejuvenilejus204 In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Court reversed Eddings' capital sentence by a five-tofour margin on the procedural ground that the trial court had failed to consider Eddings' youthfulness and "family background" as a mitigating factor. The four dissenting
justices, Burger, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, would have addressed the issue on
which the case was initially presented, namely, whether the eighth amendment prohibits
the execution of young offenders, and would have ruled that it did not. AlthoughJustice
Scalia has replaced Chief Justice Burger since the Eddings decision, Justice Scalia has
voted with the five-to-four majorities in upholding capital punishment in two recent
death penalty cases. See Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987); McCleskey v. Kemp,
107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
205 See supra note 172 and accompanying text. At its Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, in August, 1983, the American Bar Association adopted the following resolution:
Be it resolved, that the American Bar Association opposes, in principle, the imposition of capital punishment upon any person for any offenses committed while under
the age of eighteen (18).
ABA Opposes Capital Punishmentfor Persons Under 18, 69 A.B.AJ. 1925 (1983).
206 See, e.g., Streib, supra note 172, at 631. Streib notes that:
More than three-fourths of the nations of the world (73 of 93 reporting countries)
have set age eighteen as the minimum age for execution. The United Nations endorsed this position in 1976 ....
Contrast this benevolent international attitude
with the current "get tough" attitude toward violent juvenile offenders that seems
to be sweeping legislatures and the judiciary in the United States.
Id. See also Hill, supra note 170, at 18.
207 On October 5, 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. See Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63
MINN. L. REv. 35 (1978). Article six of the covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on either pregnant women or children under the
age of eighteen. Id. at 72.
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tice process, 20 8 it also raises some submerged questions about the
quality of procedural justice in juvenile court.
The decades since Gault have witnessed a substantial procedural convergence between juvenile courts and adult criminal
courts. Many of the formal procedural attributes of criminal courts
are now routine aspects of the administration ofjuvenile justice as
well. The greater procedural formality and adversarial nature of the
juvenile court also reflect the attenuation of the juvenile court's
therapeutic mission and the increased emphasis of its social control
functions as the relative emphases on rehabilitating offenders and
protecting the public have shifted. The many instances in which
states choose to treat juvenile offenders procedurally similarly to
2
adult criminal defendants is one aspect of this process. 09
Despite the criminalization of the juvenile court, it remains
nearly as true today as two decades ago that "the child receives the
worst of both worlds: that [the child] gets neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." 2 10 Most state juvenile codes provide
neither special procedural safeguards to protect juveniles from the
208 See, e.g., Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 6, at 585-601. One consequence of
emphasizing prior convictions as a prerequisite to waiver would be to exert significant
pressure at each level of the system-police, intake, prosecutor, and court-to objectify
the criteria upon which dispositional decisions are made. In turn, such a result would
give more weight to such legally relevant factors as offense and prior history and less to
factors that create dangers of discrimination and inequity in the exercise of discretion
such as race, class, and attitude. Id. at 590.
209 See generally CriminalizingJuvenileJustice, supra note 2. See also supra notes 3-4.
210 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 55 (1966). In an earlier article, Crinminalizing
JuvenileJustice, supra note 2, identified a number of instances in which the procedural
safeguards afforded to juvenile offenders are not comparable either formally or functionally to those provided to adult criminal defendants. Juveniles were found to waive
their Miranda rights and their right to counsel under a standard that, in practice, is unlikely to discern whether they adequately understand the rights they relinquished. Id. at
169-90. The high rate of waiver of counsel, in particular, is an indictment of the entire
juvenile adjudicative apparatus because the effective assistance of counsel is the necessary prerequisite to the invocation of every other procedural safeguard. Id. at 186-90.
Similarly, preventive detention, deplorable in its own right, further disadvantages a
youth at adjudication and disposition. Id. at 191-208. The inadequate screening and
charging practices used in juvenile court result in more youths being drawn more deeply
into the process. Id. at 217-29. The absence of counsel to challenge deficient petitions
leads many youths to admit allegations that cannot be proved. Combining the suppression hearing with the trial on the merits is also a highly prejudicial practice that increases
the likelihood of erroneous determinations of guilt. Id. at 229-43. The denial of jury
trials and public trials raises troubling questions about the factual accuracy of delinquency adjudications. Id. at 243-46. At the same time, an analysis of sentencing practices and conditions of institutional confinement indicates that whatever the
rehabilitative justifications for these procedural deficiencies may have been, such justifications are increasingly untenable in a juvenile court system that is explicitly punitive
and offense-oriented rather than rehabilitative and offender-oriented. Id. at 246-66.

530

BARRY C. FELD

[Vol. 78

consequences of their own immaturity nor the full panoply of adult
criminal procedural safeguards to protect them from punitive state
intervention. Instead, they increase the likelihood that juveniles will
continue to receive the worst of both worlds by treating juvenile offenders just like adult criminal defendants when formal equality redounds to their disadvantage, yet provide less effective juvenile
court procedures when those procedural deficiencies redound to the
advantage of the state.
Two procedural aspects of juvenile justice administration are
critical when making offenses count both for removal from juvenile
court and for sentencing as an adult. Although the Supreme
Court's decision in McKeiver, which denied juveniles a constitutional
right to jury trial, emphasized "factual accuracy" and posited virtual
parity between juvenile and adult adjudications, 2 1' the validity of
that equation is subject to question. Judges and juries apply the
Winship Court's "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
2 12
differently.
Juries serve special protective functions in assuring the accuracy of factual determinations, and studies show that juries are more likely to
acquit than are judges. Substantive criminal guilt is not just "factual
guilt" but a complex assessment of moral culpability. The power of
jury nullification provides a nexus between the legislature's original
criminalization decision and the community's felt sense of justice in
the application of laws to a particular case. These tendencies are attributable to various factors, including jury-judge evaluations of evidence, jury sentiments about the "law" (jury equity), and jury
defendant (ofwhich youthfulness garnered the greatsympathy for2the
13
est support).
The McKeiver Court's decision to deny the provision juries in juvenile court proceedings makes it easier to convict a youth appearing
before ajudge in juvenile court than to convict a youth, on the basis
of the same evidence, before ajury of detached citizens in a criminal
proceeding. 2 14 Furthermore, the subsequent use of qualitatively inMoreover, while these procedural deficiencies were analyzed separately, the prejudicial
consequences are cumulative, and the whole is far worse than the sum of its parts.
211 See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
212 CriminalizingJuvenileJustice,supra note 2, at 244-46.
213 Id. at 245. See generally R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY

(1983).
214 See P. GREENWOOD, A. LIPSON, A. ABRAHAMSE & F. ZIMRING, YOUTH CRIME AND

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 30-31 (1983). Greenwood, Lipson, Abrahamse, and
Zimring analyzed juvenile justice administration in California, compared the attrition
rates of similar types of cases in juvenile and adult courts, and concluded that "it is
easier to win a conviction in the juvenile court than in the criminal court, with comparable types of cases." Id.
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ferior convictions to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and enhance
sentences as adults raises profound issues of procedural justice.
Once waiver is analyzed as a sentencing decision, the propriety
of enhancing adult penalties based on juvenile convictions obtained
without jury trials or counsel becomes even more troublesome.
There is a substantial problem with using prior convictions to enhance subsequent penalites if the prior convictions were obtained
without the assistance of counsel or an adequate waiver of counsel.
Although juveniles have been constitutionally entitled to the right to
counsel since Gault,21 5 it is a right which is more honored in the
breach than in the observance.
In the two decades since Gault, the promise of counsel remains
unrealized; in most states, less than 50% of the juveniles adjudicated delinquent receive the assistance of counsel to which they are
constitutionally entitled. 2 16 In the immediate aftermath of Gault,
evaluation research examined institutional compliance and found
that juveniles were neither adequately advised of their right to counsel nor appointed counsel. 2 17 Although national statistics are not
available, surveys of representation by counsel in several jurisdictions suggest that "there is reason to think that lawyers still appear
[in juvenile court] much less often than might have been expected." 2 18 Indeed, the one inescapable fact ofjuvenile justice administration in those states in which data is available is that the
majority of all youths prosecuted as delinquents are not represented
by counsel during the process. 2 19 While there are several possible
215 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. See generally CriminalizingJuvenileJustice,

supra note 2, at 186-90.
216 See CriminalizingJuvenile Justice, supra note 2, at 187-90.
217 See, e.g., Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, In Search ofJuvenileJustice: Gault and Its
Implementation, 3 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 491 (1969); V. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH:

A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS

(1972).
218 D. HOROwrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 185 (1977). Although the rates of
representation vary widely from county to county within a state, Horowitz' survey of the

available data failed to find one state in which even 50% of the juveniles were represented by counsel.
219

In an evaluation of legal representation in North Carolina, Clarke and Koch re-

ported that the Juvenile Defender Project provided representation for 22.3% of the juvenile offenders in Winston-Salem, N.C. and 45.8% of the juvenile offenders in

Charlotte, N.C. Clarke & Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Control, and Do Lawyers
Make a Difference?, 14 LAw & Soc'v REV. 263, 297 (1980). In a recent survey, Bortner
evaluated a large midwestern county's juvenile court and reported that "[o]ver half (58.2
percent) [of the juveniles] were not represented by an attorney." M. BORTNER, INSIDE A
JUVENILE COURT: THE TARNISHED IDEA OF INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE

139 (1982). Evalua-

tions of rates of representation in Minnesota also show that a majority of youths go
unrepresented. CriminalizingJuvenileJustice, supra note 2, at 189; K. FINE, OUT OF HOME
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN IN MINNESOTA: A RESEARCH REPORT 48 (1983)("In the major-
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explanations for why so many youths are unrepresented despite
Gault's promise of the right to counsel, 220 mostjuveniles face potentially coercive state action without seeing a lawyer, waive their right
to counsel without consulting with an attorney or appreciating the
legal consequences, and, thereby, face the prosecutorial power of
the state alone and unaided. 22 1 Although waiver of the right to
counsel is the most common explanation, the variations in rates of
representation within a state suggest that nonrepresentation reflects
judicial policies, especially juvenile court judges' continuing hostility toward lawyers, rather than any systematic differences in youthful
2 22
competence.
Using prior convictions to enhance subsequent penalties implicates the quality of procedural justice in juvenile court, especially if
the prior convictions were obtained without the assistance of counsel or an adequate waiver of counsel. In Scott v. Illinois,223 the
Supreme Court upheld the denial of counsel as constitutionally
valid if the uncounselled conviction did not result in incarceration.
In Baldasarv. Illinois,224 the defendant was denied counsel, convicted

of a misdemeanor, and fined and placed on probation. 2 25 The defendant in Baldasarwas convicted a second time for a similar offense,
and, under an enhanced penalty statute, the prior uncounselled conviction was used to convert the second conviction into a felony for
ity of delinquency/status offense cases (62%) there is not representation.") As in virtually all juvenile justice research, these evaluations report enormous county-by-county

variations in the rates of nonrepresentation, ranging from a high of over 90% to a low of
less than 10%. CriminalizingJuvenileJusice,supra note 2, at 190 n.162.
220 The high rate of waiver of counsel is an indictment of the entire juvenile adjudicative apparatus because the effective assistance of counsel is the necessary prerequisite to
the invocation of every other procedural safeguard. Typically proffered explanations for
the nonrepresentation of youth include: parental reluctance to retain an attorney; inadequate public-defender legal services in rural areas; a judicial encouragement of and
readiness to find waivers of the right to counsel in order to ease courts' administrative
burdens; a continuing judicial hostility to an advocacy role in a traditional treatmentoriented court; and a judicial predetermination of dispositions with nonappointment of

counsel if probation is the anticipated outcome. See, e.g., CriminalizingJuvenile Justice,
supra note 2, at 190; M. BORTNER, supra note 219, at 136-47.
221 Juveniles are permitted to "waive" their constitutional rights, including the right
to counsel, providing that their waiver is "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" under

the "totality of the circumstances." See generally CriminalizingJuvenileJustice,supra note 2,

at 169-90. Although the competence of children to fully understand and waive their
rights has been questioned by researchers, courts reviewing waivers of rights assume
that children are capable of "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" relinquishing
their constitutional rights and that trial courts are capable of discerning when they do
not. See id. at 174 n.113, 176 n.121.
222 See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
223 404 U.S. 367 (1979).
224 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
225 Id. at 223.
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which the defendant was imprisoned. In a per curiam opinion, the
Supreme Court reversed the defendant's felony conviction. 22 6 The
Court's decision in Baldasaris consistent with an earlier line of cases
in which the Court held that an uncounselled felony conviction
could not be used in a later trial to enhance punishments under re22 7
cidivist statutes.
Although Gault granted juveniles the right to counsel, most
juveniles are routinely adjudicated or enter guilty pleas without the
assistance of counsel, an opportunity to consult with counsel, or,
arguably, a valid waiver of counsel. 2 28 Before ajuvenile's prior convictions can be used to enhance punishment, whether through presumptive waiver, legislatively excluded jurisidiction, or for
sentencing as an adult, it must be established that the prior uncounselled convictions were validly obtained. The most expedient way to
prevent prior convictions from invalidating later waiver decisions or
adult sentences is to assure that juveniles either have counsel appointed automatically or that they at least consult with counsel prior
to waiver. Short of that, all of the procedural deficiencies of the
juvenile court simply cumulate until the ultimate sanction is
imposed.

226 Id. at 222. Justice Stewart condemned the increased penalty, noting that the defendant "was sentenced to an increased term of imprisonment only because he had been
convicted in a previous prosecution in which he had not had the assistance of appointed
counsel in his defense." Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Justice Marshall stated that a defendant's "prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
could not be used collaterally to impose an increased term of imprisonment upon a
subsequent conviction." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
227 See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S.
109, 114 (1967). In Burgett, the Supreme Court noted that because it was unconstitutional to convict a person for a felony without benefit of a lawyer or the valid waiver of
that benefit
[t]o permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used
against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense
... is to erode the principle of that case. Worse yet, since the defect in the prior
conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from
the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right.
389 U.S. at 115.
228 See generally CriminalizingJuvenileJustice, supra note 2, at 169-90.

